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an exercise in the practice of biodiversity 






n a recent trip that I took to town, the roads were deserted 
and a family of woodducks was walking near the edge of 
the road. Ten minutes later I returned and one dead 
woodduck was in the middle of the road. As ducks 
generally walk slowly across the road, it was easy to assume that the 
driver of a car had, maliciously, failed to slow down for them. The 
driver had further failed to stop after hitting the duck, not knowing 
perhaps that the whole family would gather around the dead one 
and thereby risk death from other reckless drivers. I picked up the 
duck. It was still warm and carried it off the road. As all of the ducks 
followed, I placed it near a pond, as far away from the road as 
possible. Another unnecessary death had occurred and another 
social fabric of an animal species disrupted. The damage was not just 
done to one but in this case to several members of the species. Had 
the duck been alive and not too badly injured it would have been 
taken into care and then released back into the same group. 
 
Of late, topics of rehabilitation and release of wildlife have come 
under a good deal of scrutiny in Australia. Some have argued that 
rehabilitation is a waste of time. The recent article by Glenn Albrecht 
in Animal Issues 1 spoke of the many shortcomings of rehabilitation 
and it is partly to this paper that I wish to respond, although this is 
taken largely as a starting point to the general debate about 
                                                 
1 Animal Issues, Vol 2, 1, 1998. 
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reintroduction, captive breeding and rehabilitation of native 
Australian wildlife. 
The human species has inflicted severe damage on its environment 
and on other species. In 1981 Special Survival Plans (SSPs) were set 
up by the International Union for the Conservation of National 
Species Survival Commissions (IUCN/SSC). At that time, 75 species 
were listed as endangered and the list has grown ever since. 
Inevitably, the desire to save species from extinction has led to 
detailed discussions and research on how best to achieve this. 
 
There have been many successes in protecting wildlife both at 
individual and species levels, ranging from howler monkeys in 
Berlize, to the Californian condor, to the European peregrine falcon 
and to the South African vulture programs. A few of the projects 
have been so successful that they have even caused a glut of the 
species.2 To argue at any level that rehabilitation (including 
restocking, translocation, and captive breeding) is futile or 
unsuccessful is to miss the point about what can be done and has 
already been achieved. 
 
Activities have occurred in all areas of rehabilitation. One is 
restocking (replenishment of existing stock of species), another 
reintroduction (reintroducing a species to an area that was known to 
have been home to a specific species before but had disappeared) 
and a third common method is translocation (taking species from 
one area to another). These activities are by their very nature often 
projects of some magnitute. They usually concern species that are 
vulnerable or endangered; although intentional translocations (over 
700 in new world English speaking countries between 1973 and 
1986) also included many game species for sporting purposes.3 There 
are cases in which a species may become overabundant in one small 
pocket while, through its natural habitat range, it has actually 
become rare and vulnerable. 
 
                                                 
2 C.D. Ankney, ‘An embarrassment of riches: Too many geese’, Journal of Wildlife 
Management , 60, (1996), pp. 217-223. 
3 B. Griffith, J. M. Scott, et al., ‘Translocation as a species conservation tool: Status 
and strategy.’ Science , 245, (1989), pp. 477-480. 
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Rehabilitation of individuals belonging to a species currently 
classified as abundant may occur also. We should not overlook this 
category. Admittedly, it is more dramatic to speak about saving a 
species at risk of extinction than about saving animals which are 
abundant or common. Why would one want to save an animal of a 
species that is plentiful? First, if our concerns focus only on the thin 
end of the wedge, we would have no mechanisms in place to prevent 
species from sliding into the risk zone in the first place. Second, we 
need to stop and ask the humane question: Why ask such a question 
at all? We do not stop treating humans for ailments, fractures and 
diseases because of their abundance. The value ranking of species 
according to numbers and known stock is a dangerous game. It may 
be temporarily unavoidable as we recognise the urgency for some 
specific species and specific ecosystems such as wetlands. However, 
pragmatism itself can create value hierarchies and pave the ground 
for a particular ethics, i.e. it is possible to associate 'urgency' with 
value and to attribute value only to things that are rare. Ultimately, 
such conclusions would be extremely detrimental to biodiversity. 
 
There is no doubt that the last two decades have set all those 
concerned on a steep learning curve. Mistakes have been plentiful 
and some efforts perhaps even woefully inadequate. Also, 
controversy has surrounded some projects and ideas. However, it is 
clear that over this timespan, we, collectively, have gained a much 
clearer perspective on strategies, legislature, project planning and 
complexity. This article embraces at least a cautious optimism that 
we are beginning to see successes that are worth noting. It deals with 
some of the controversies and issues. 
 
Assessing the state of species 
 
There are assessment criteria available before any rehabilitation, 
reintroduction or translocation of wildlife is commenced and these 
should be used (see Table 1 below). This checklist, which according 
to Jeffrey M. Black, contains vital information on which rational 
decisions for the release of wildlife can be made4, falls into four main 
                                                 
4 J.M. Black, ‘Threatened Waterfowl: Recovery priorities and reintroduction 
potential with special reference to the Hawaiian Goose’, in Avian Conservation. 
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domains: testing biopolitical conditions, environmental conditions, 
resources and the condition of the species involved. Our 
preparedness to follow through on such an assessment is often 
counteracted by lack of funds, limited by political will and 
circumscribed by scientific knowledge of the species or of the 
context. Moreover, behaviour of the species is all too often 
underrated as an important, if not vital, component in achieving 
successful outcomes in diagnosis and release. And preempting a 
later point, one might have to concede that the term 'success' is itself 
in need of definition and by no means an agreed upon standard. 
 
Ideally, in any attempt of reintroduction of a species, even in 
translocation exercises, all four assessment criteria for a given 
species should be thoroughly known and evaluated. Unfortunately, 
this is not always possible. Sometimes it is a lack of understanding of 










Human Preparedness  
in Australia  




No negative  
impact locally 
 
 Community support  
exists 
          4 - 5 
 GOs/NGOs*  
involved/supportive 
          4 - 5 
 Conformity with and  
protection available  
by laws 
          4 - 5 
Environmental  
conditions 
Removal of cause  
of decline 
          2 - 4 
 Habitat availability  
(protected) 
          1 - 5 
 Habitat unsaturated           1 - 4 
                                                                                                                           
Research and Management, eds. J.M. Marzluff and R. Sallabanks, (Island Press, 
Washington, 1998), pp. 125-140. 
 







technology known  
and available 
 
 Knowledge of species  
(biology, ecology,  
behaviour, vet. science) 
          1 - 4 
 Sufficient financial  
resources 
          0 - 3 
Condition  
of species 
Wild population needs  
supplementation to  
remain viable 
 
 New stock available  
 No jeopardy to wild  
populations 
 
Source: adapted from Black, ‘Threatened Waterfowl’, pp. 125-140. 
Abbreviations GOs/NG0s refer to government/non-government organisations. 
The latter include non-profit, volunteer and charitable organisations that are 
autonomous in structure and funding but are licensed/approved and abide by 





To address all four criteria of assessment briefly, my first point 
concerns the biopolitical and the recent criticisms of an ethics of care. 
Community support for the saving and maintaining of native 
wildlife in Australia is currently widespread. Government 
organisations and non-government voluntary organisations have 
mushroomed throughout Australia. In these contexts, many 
endeavours in wildlife care have evolved as single species efforts 
and the focus is on the saving of individuals. Much of this 
involvement is at first an involvement of the heart, a commitment 
grown from compassion. Albrecht’s paper implied that human 
compassion as a mere emotion is unfocussed and ultimately useless. 
He states that such emotion, by implication, is spurious in 
achievement, narrow in concept, ethical only in appearance rather 
than content, and finally ecologically ‘unjust’. The argument made is 
that an individual is saved at the expense of broader contexts and 
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that money is diverted into ‘warm and fuzzy’ feelings for 
samaritarian works while the context (the environment) is left 
without proper resourcing and overall planning is neglected. 
Emotion is pitted against rationality and planning. 
 




Here is my second point: Albrecht seems to argue that there is only 
one way to establish long-lasting results and that is by planning for 
an overall 'system'. We must distinguish here between ecosystem as 
a description of the world's environment in toto and as a term that 
describes very specific environments - a rain forest, wetlands, open 
woodlands, etc. I am using the term in the latter meaning because 
this is how arguments on targetted saving of environments have 
been used. The systems approach can have substantial merit. Indeed, 
we need to work for the maintenance and for the creation of habitats 
in which biodiversity can exist - if indeed we still understand what a 
healthy, functioning and self-sustaining ecosystem is.5 However, 
systems approaches cannot be the only approach. Norton argued 
some years ago that reliance on scientific information is important 
for most decisions we make, including those concerned with whole 
ecosystems. However, he argues, we know so little about whole 
ecosystems that whole ecosystem decisions are under-supplied by 
scientific information itself.6 The Birdlife International Biodiversity 
Project identified 221 endemic bird areas covering 5 per cent of the 
earth's land surface on which 75 per cent of the world's 300 and more 
threatened species occur. Hence, the emphasis on concentrating on 
specific endemic areas and thereby saving the largest possible 
number of endangered species7. Bibly rightly replied, however, that 
the ecosystem approach is not very useful for threatened species 
outside of such specific ecosystems or indeed for species with small 
                                                 
5 R.Costanza, B.G. Norton et al., eds., Ecosystem Health. New Goals for 
Environmental Management, (Island Press, Washington, D.C., 1992). 
6 B.G. Norton, ‘A New Paradigm for Environmental Management’, in Costanza et 
al, Ecosystem Health. 
7 V.H. Heywood, Global Biodiversity Assessment, (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995). 
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numbers.8 One might add that some species frequent several distinct 
zones and would not necessarily be saved if only just one targetted 
ecosystem was protected. 
 
Habitat conditions are of crucial importance in Australia where 
white stewardship of the land over the last two hundred years has 
led to some of the most catastrophic records. Australia holds the top 
position on the rate of extinction of native species in the world. It has 
the world's worst extinction rate for mammals—seventeen species or 
ten percent in 200 years representing five times the global average, 
97 plant species and 2000 more are threatened, again about ten 
percent.9 Particularly the mammals of inland Australia have 
suffered.10 Over one thousand native species, as many as a third of 
all Australian mammals, are in danger of extinction. For instance, it 
was reported in 1995 that of the eighteen nationally recognised 
species and subspecies of bandicoot, thirteen are extinct, 
endangered, vulnerable or threatened.11 Australia also now has the 
most endangered amphibians and reptiles in the world.12 Recher 
pointed out some years ago that, in the past, avifauna has often not 
even featured in these tallies. We are only now beginning to gain a 
clearer picture of the 'abundance' and losses of some species.13 
 
One third of Australian forest and woodland are gone forever and 
three quarters of Australia's rain forest has entirely disappeared.14 It 
is still disappearing at an alarming rate. Australia has about 550 
national parks covering three per cent of the land area.15 For the 
remaining 97 per cent Australia has kept cutting vegetation at almost 
                                                 
8 C.J. Bibly, ‘A global view of priorities for bird conservation: A summary’, Ibis, 
137, (1995), S247-S248. 
9 G. Dunkley, The Greening of the Red. Sustainability, Socialism and the Environmental 
Crisis, (Pluto Press, Leichhardt, NSW, 1992). 
10 S.R. Morton, ‘European Settlement and the Mammals of Arid Australia’, 
Australian Environmental History, ed., S.Dovers, (Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, 1994). 
11 J. Woodford, ‘Endangered bandicoot gets second chance at life in a cat-free 
zone’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5, (1995). 
12 N. Bita, ‘Environment worth $663bn to our future’, The Australian, 3, (1996). 
13 H.F. Recher, (website), ‘Ground-dwelling and ground-foraging birds: the next 
round of extinctions?’, Armidale, NSW, University of New England.n.d. 
http://www.environment.gov.au/life/general-info/biolinks/biolink4.html. 
14 Dunkley, The Greening of the Red. 
15 Bita, ‘Environment worth $663bn to our future’. 
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the same rate as in the Amazon16, specifically rainforest in New 
South Wales and tropical rainforests in Queensland and the 
Northern Territory and so-called ‘marginal’ open woodlands, about 
400,000 to 600,000 hectares per annum. Ten percent of all cropland 
and as much as a quarter of pasture have been destroyed beyond 
repair and over half of Australia's farmland is salinated or degraded 
(80 per cent in NSW) and in need of restoration.17 
 
This overall tally of losses aside, removal of the source of decline of 
some endangered species can be quite simple—at least in theory. It is 
well-established that introduced feral species (plants and animals) 
have created havoc for native flora and fauna. They have created 
competition and predator-relationships for which the Australian 
native species are simply not prepared. It is indeed useless to 
reintroduce koalas into an area that is infested with feral dogs, foxes 
and cats. The survival chances of the koala would be nearly zero in 
such an environment. However, there are individuals like John 
Wamsley who has started investing his money and time into earth 
sanctuaries. He has become Australia’s most successful breeder of 
endangered species. And the secret to his success is simple. He 
constructed special fences that formed a reliable barrier for potential 
predators and then removed all foxes, cats and dogs from the newly 
created sanctuaries. The natural recovery rate within these precincts 
was enormous.18 
 
There is no doubt, that action needs to be taken at all levels and 
needs to occur simultaneously. To give an example, there is little 
point in restocking an endangered avian population via captive 
breeding programs if the cause of the decline is not at least partially 
removed first. When the cause of the decline is known to be 
associated with a shortage of suitable tree hollows for nesting, for 
example, one would need to provide alternative nesting sites (such 
as boxes) first. At the same time, one would need to implement plans 
to either protect trees that will provide suitable nesting sites (and 
food) or plant tree species that will eventually provide suitable 
                                                 
16 T. Caswell, The Green Agenda for 1994,, (Australian Conservation Foundation, 
Fitzroy,Victoria, 1994). 
17 Dunkley, The Greening of the Red. 
18 J. Woodford, ‘The ravaged country: our shame’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
(1996), p. 25 & p. 28. 
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nesting sites. For propagation of a species, such as the red-tailed 
black cockatoo, natural recovery rate would be partially dependent 
on the availability of large tree-hollows which in turn will develop 
naturally only in trees older than 100 years, hence long-term 
planning is involved here. Short-term activities can prove to be 
valuable measures as a stop-gap, until some essential natural 
conditions can be restored. 
 
Resource conditions and individual rehabilitation 
 
It is possible to repair some damage to wildlife relatively easily. 
Other forms of recovery, however, may require substantial funding, 
and all of the approaches require knowledge of the species and its 
context. Australia's past approach to gaining and maintaining 
knowledge of its own native fauna has been marred by colonial 
status and derogatory European attitudes. We are now beginning to 
overcome these attitudes but by no means, as yet, has the shortfall of 
knowledge been redressed. This is especially true for our avifauna. 
 
At formal governmental level, resources and the cost efficieny model 
offer another vista. In the last year or so, it has been said that there 
are economic decisions to be made in connection with protecting the 
flora and fauna of Australia. The argument runs roughly like this: 
we have only a small pot of money and, given these limitations, we 
need to think carefully on how we distribute the funds and where 
we place our financial efforts in order to maximise outcomes. The 
answer is invariably that saving of single species is not as effective in 
the long run as is saving of whole ecosystems. In other words, we 
should not concentrate our resources on saving a stork but on saving 
the wetlands in which storks and a myriad of other species can 
continue to exist. The latter is part of a very long-standing and well-
established debate world-wide. It is also important not to target 
merely those species that are currently on the vulnerable or 
endangered lists but, again, whole ecosystems that might have 
supported these endangered species before. This point of view can 
be questioned in several ways, as follows. 
 
Individual rehabilitation and cost 
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With respect to individual rehabilitation the above argument has 
several flaws. First, the overall argument on cost efficiency cannot be 
applied easily to rehabilitation of individual animals. Arguments 
favouring cost-effective planning for specific ecosystems often imply 
that wildlife rehabilitation costs a lot of money that would better be 
rechanneled into ecosystem preservation. The problem is that this 
attitude implies that there is a pot of gold spent on wildlife 
rehabilitation in this country. 
 
This implied message of cost to government and to the broader 
public is bordering on gross misinformation. Not all but most 
endeavours of wildlife rehabilitation in Australia are undertaken by 
volunteers, some of them on an individual basis and most others 
now within rehabilitation and rescue organisations that may be 
under the auspices of government departments (such as National 
Parks and Wildlife). Typically, they receive no funds, equipment or 
any other assistance from government sources (state or federal). 
Some of the wildlife rehabilitation and rescue organisations are now 
rather large and well organised, particularly in New South Wales 
and Victoria. 
 
Economically, the argument that rehabilitation of individual wildlife 
is a waste of time is particularly misleading and certainly false by 
any economic measure. First, it is important to stress that much of 
the work and cost is borne by people who do not get paid for the 
work they do. They are certainly not a burden on government funds 
or taxes. Funds are raised in the community and channelled directly 
back into care for wildlife (as for expensive medical treatment or 
equipment). Wildlife organisations are self-funding and usually have 
the status of charitable organisations. They do some fund-raising 
through the year, often by selling products with a wildlife message 
and very occasionally by donations. The rest of the income is derived 
from membership fees. Running costs, at least in Wildlife 
Information and Rescue Services (WIRES), one organisation that I 
know very well, are kept to an absolute minimum and are largely 
confined to such things as stationery, telephone costs and postage at 
the local branch level. At branch level, all members of the 
organisation are unpaid. 
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All members provide for the animals out of their own pockets. This 
may involve aviaries for birds, pens for kangaroos, gunyahs for 
koalas and a whole host of ‘hospital’ accommodation, including 
sheets, blankets, electric blankets, heating, boxes, pouches, 
terrariums for reptiles and so forth. Then there is medication to be 
paid for, appropriate food to be provided, petrol costs for rescuing, 
collecting and releasing an animal—again, these are items that are 
paid for out of the pockets of the volunteers. During late spring and 
summer, we may each travel as much as 200km per week solely for 
wildlife rehabilitation work. This is of course more of an issue in 
rural areas than in city environments, but petrol costs alone may be 
considerable. The cost for the volunteer, apart from a membership 
fee, may range from $50 a year to anything in the hundreds or even 
thousands. 
Funds spent on individual wildlife rescue and rehabilitation add up 
when counting all individuals involved. WIRES in New South Wales, 
for instance has currently about 1,500 members. If each member 
spends only $100 per annum (including membership fees), the 
annual expenditure for animals exceeds $150,000 by one organisation 
alone, a sizeable outlay of costs to help our wildlife. Even if all costs 
outlayed privately by wildlife carers were added together, the cost of 
rehabilitation of wild-born species is considerably cheaper than any 
zoo captive breeding program could ever be. Indeed, species 
maintenance costs in captive breeding programs have been 
calculated as being about 300 per cent higher than conservation costs 
in the wild19 and this is a measure of public expenditure. The true 
conservation cost is even lower in Australia because of the large 
commitment of voluntary wildlife care groups. 
 
These costs are not costs that anyone can debate and include in any 
theoretical or financial discussion as if  they were public funds. The 
cost being met by the individual carers comes from their private 
pocket. There are species re-introductions masterminded by funded 
and paid labour as well but, so far, these are minute efforts 
compared to individual rehabilitation of wildlife by volunteers, even 
though they attract a good deal more media attention. 
 
                                                 
19 A.P. Dobson, Conservation and Biodiversity, (Scientific American Library, New 
York, 1996). 
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Human intervention in the natural world and 
rehabilitation 
 
My third argument concerns the implied criticism of human 
intervention in animal survival. This set of arguments is, of 
necessity, pragmatic, anecdotal and informed merely by my own 
longstanding practice of rehabilitation of Australian wildlife and by 
considerable time spent writing about and observing wildlife 
rehabilitation outside Australia. 
 
In my own practice of caring for birds, about 65-78 per cent of birds 
brought into care get released. Of the 22 percent who do not make it 
to release stage, about 5 percent have died whilst in care while 17 per 
cent have to be euthanased. My own figures compare well with 
Wildlife Rehabilitation Statistics from the USA made available in the 
last few years. Between 1995-1997 they show that at least half of the 
admitted animals were released, while additional others, which 
presumably have also been successfully released, were transported 
to more suitable care sites.20 
 
Rehabilitation of wildborn injured adult animals 
 
Causes of death vary from overload of parasites to severe traumatic 
events, the latter being the predominant cause of misadventure. The 
nature of the injuries or damages that ground the birds in the first 
place are of some importance here. The most important of these are 
traumatic events. They can be subdivided into several categories: 
 
1. human induced and human caused 
2. feral/domestic animal induced and caused 
3. natural events 
4. disease 
 
In my own experience, the most common cause of coming into care 
are traumatic events caused by humans (presented in category 1). 
This tallies well with the results of a detailed study of birds of prey 
in another part of the world. They studied the causes of admission to 
                                                 
20 Website, ‘Wildlife Rehabilitation Statistics’, (1998). 
http://www.ndsu.nodak.edu/instruct/devold/twrid/html/stats.htm. 
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the zoo animal and exotic pet clinic of the veterinary faculty in 
Zurich between 1 January 1985 and 31 December 1994. Forty-seven 
per cent of all admissions in that period were trauma and half of 
them suffered from fractures, caused usually by car accidents.21 
 
Human induced and human caused traumatic events can be 
subdivided into malicious and intentional, preventable and 
accidental. Fortunately, today, most harm inflicted by humans on 
wildlife is no longer malicious or intentional. But there are still 
examples of this. Recently I received an Australian Hobby 
(Australia's smallest falcon) whose legs were both cleanly snapped 
off high at the thigh. The type of cut suggested the use of a now 
illegal rabbit trap. Some farmers (very few now) still falsely believe 
that birds of prey are enemies of their lifestock and a few have been 
suspected of placing baited rabbit traps on fences. The birds caught 
in these traps die a most cruel death of starvation which may take up 
to a fortnight. Needless to add that the Hobby was euthanased. 
Shooting of wedgetailed eagles also does occur still in some parts of 
Australia and this too is based on ignorance or misinformation, and 
sometimes on callousness. 
 
Many birds and indeed other Australian native wildlife suffer or die 
from human induced acts which are preventable. The largest 
category of injuries I receive come from road accidents, including 
broken limbs and bones, concussions, lacerations—indeed the whole 
range of injuries that humans may also sustain when hit by a car. In 
addition, injured animals suffer from shock and dehydration. 
Occasionally, birds are brought in that have been caught in barbed 
wire fences or have flown against a window at high speed. 
 
Preventable categories of injuries to birds concern also the poor habit 
of poisoning either to catch introduced pests and predators such as 
foxes or rodents. Unfortunately, baits are not marked ‘foxes only 
                                                 
21 J.M. Hatt, R. Baumgartner, et al., ‘Diagnosis and therapy of raptors with a 
compilation of cases 1985-1994’, Schweizer Archiv fuer Tierheilkunde 138/9, (1996), 
pp. 434-440.  
Latest data from WIRES show that approximately 11 percent of animals in WIRES 
care (all animal groups) are a result of motor vehicle accidents. (The rate of 
accident survivors and deaths may be considerably higher for some avian species, 
see later). 
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please’ and birds on the upper end of the food-chain may die as a 
consequence of poisoned bait. Another preventable cause of death 
concerns the group of herbicides and insecticides that are sometimes 
sprayed excessively. Tawny frogmouths, for instance, are extremely 
susceptible to poisoning by insecticides. I have used humidicribs and 
oxygen support to treat poisoned Tawny frogmouths with 
symptoms similar to dyptheria and accompanied by general 
paralysis. 
 
These damages described above are human induced and show the 
conflictual side of the encounter between human civilisation 
activities and the natural world in the most dramatic and visible 
form. The question is, what conclusions we draw from this 
information? 
 
The argument that opponents to wildlife rehabilitation either imply 
or even state is that interference in the natural order of things is a 
bad thing. They argue that there is a high attrition rate of young 
offspring in many species that is natural. That is certainly true, both 
of avian and mammalian species. For instance, in drought years, 
ringtail or brushtail possums and red or eastern grey kangaroo 
offspring may have a mortality rate above 65 per cent or even higher 
in their first months or year of life.22 There is also a ‘natural’ selection 
by disease and levels of skill that each individual member of the 
species needs to develop. Those that do not develop them to high 
levels will perish. A bird of prey that is not a good hunter will die or 
at least not reproduce. Generally, the argument is implied or stated 
that the weak, the sick and the old will perish. Only the healthy, the 
strong and/or the resourceful will survive and will therefore 
maintain a healthy ‘gene-pool’ and levels of skills ensuring survival 
for future generations. The argument goes on to say that wildlife 
rehabilitation interferes in the natural selection of species by 
supporting the weak, the sick and the old and it therefore 
contributes to weakening the wildlife generally. 
 
                                                 
22 A.S.I. London, ‘Lactation and neonatal survival of mammals’, in Advances in 
Animal Conservation, eds. J.P.Hearn and J. K. Hodges, (Clarendon Press, Oxford , 
1985), 54, pp. 183-207. 
 
   
 
15 
The problem with this view is not that there may be a process 
described by the name of 'natural selection' (where do accidents rank 
in the 'natural' selection process?) but that it is assumed that the 
victims of injuries belong into the category of the weak, sick, old or 
unskilled. Here we have the strongest error of logic. Suffering an 
accident as a consequence of contact with humans does not 
necessarily denote individual weakness or unsuitability. Quite often, 
the victims are the healthy ones, selected out already through the 
natural processes to carry on their species. I do not wish to overstate 
the case, particularly in the absence of robust statistical evidence, but 
I suspect that the birds I treat may often be the healthiest, the fittest, 
the mature. 
 
The damage we cause to our environment has often been described 
in terms of environmental degradation, encroachments on ever 
decreasing areas of wilderness and remaining stands of secondary 
forests, and in terms of pollution and human self-assertion for space. 
The damage to our wildlife has also been understood as being 
caused partly by the introduction of feral species. However, one set 
of causes of the current demise that is so often left out even of 
environmental debate concerns technology itself. In only a few 
places around the globe are there any deliberate and funded 
programs that will address the effect some of our modern 
technology has on wildlife. Powerlines, the car, airplanes, boats, 
tracking stations, wire, barbed wire and electric fences are structures 
that kill animals in their hundreds and thousands. One newspaper 
pointed out recently that the road toll in New South Wales alone 
claims 7000 victims of native animals daily.23 How many are there 
really, if one includes all other areas of technology and how many 
thousands more would we count per day if we add pollutants in 
water, soil and air? And how many tens of thousands would we 
                                                 
23 A recent study of road kills in New South Wales by WIRES in conjunction with 
Professor Cooper of Macquarie University, also showed that the majority of 
animals killed on roads consist largely of native animals (80 different species in a 
sample size of 381). The species which are most affected are the grey kangaroo, the 
swamp wallaby, brushtailed and ringtail possums, wombats, bearded dragons, 
blue tongue lizards and two species of birds: the magpie and the galah (all these 
species occurred more than ten times in the sample of 381 road kills), cit. 
‘LifeWires’, Summer, 99, in D.W. Cooper, ‘Road Kills of Animals on some New 
South Wales Roads—Final Report on Data Collected by WIRES Volunteers in 
1997’, WIRES Head Office, PO Box 260 Forestville NSW 2087, p. 16’. 
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need to add to the already known carnage if we counted hunting, 
habitat loss and introduced exotic species? 
 
In evolutionary time, technological structures are not environmental 
features to which we can expect full adaptation by animals. It is not a 
sign of their lack of skill or of maladaptive behaviour if they get 
electrocuted on power-poles (in the gap between the wooden bar on 
top of a pole and the wire connection). It is not a sign of visual 
impairment if birds do not always detect metal wire fences. It 
requires no sickness or weakness to get blinded by an oncoming car, 
and it cannot be called stupidity when animals need to cross a road 
to get to water or to another part of their own territory. 
 
There are ways of fixing quite quickly and relatively cheaply at least 
some of the problems associated with technological structures. For 
instance, there are reflectors that can be placed on roads to warn 
animals, there are wind/sound creating devices to fit on bumperbars 
of cars to warn animals of oncoming traffic. Such devices could be 
fitted routinely to every car. Barbed wire could be outlawed because 
birds sustain horrific injuries from such fencing and usually have to 
be euthanased. There is a multitude of design possibilities for a 
whole host of things but the efforts are few and far between, either in 
terms of marketing and actual use, or in terms of design. We need to 
think more cleverly and compassionately about animals also in 
terms of the things we put in the environment for human use and 
convenience. 
 
I personally believe that human intervention, i.e. thinking of making 
modern technology safer for wildlife as well as wildlife 
rehabilitation itself, is vital as damage is so often caused by human 
intervention in the first place. My work, as I see it, is merely a very 
small attempt to correct for the ravages of human actions. This, I 
think, holds true both for injuries caused through human technology 
and structures, as well as for damage incurred by feral animals. 
 
The solutions concerning feral animals and the disappearance of 
suitable habitat are more complex problems to solve and have to 
involve several agencies or at least several processes simultaneously. 
The point here is that in a number of demonstrable cases, 
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intervention at the level of wildlife treatment and care is not 
sufficient by itself to make a difference in all cases. I would not 
therefore conclude that we should stop treating injured koalas but I 
would propose that programs for the control or elimination of feral 




Rehabilitation and success rate 
 
Finally, the opponents of wildlife rehabilitation argue that this 
activity is a waste of time because only a minute proportion (figures 
of 1 to ten per cent of successful releases are usually cited) of wildlife 
coming into care are supposedly surviving in the wild thereafter. I 
challenge anyone to say that we can trust any of these pessimistic 
figures at all and use them in debate about the value of wildlife 
rehabilitation. First, there are very few studies so far undertaken that 
systematically follow animals post rehabilitation, and the few studies 
are concentrated on even fewer species. Yet these figures are at times 
presented as if they concerned ALL rehabilitation efforts of ALL 
species anywhere in Australia. This is blatantly incorrect. 
 
We have few trustworthy examples of proven rehabilitation success 
and one of the reasons why we have so few is that it is often difficult 
to follow animals post-release. Tracking by transmitter devices is 
expensive and requires funding. Moreover, tracking devices are not 
always very good for the animal. Many of the wildlife rehabilitators 
specialising in birds have ensured that their birds get banded before 
release, so that their fate can be recorded should they fall into human 
hands again. In the years that raptors in my care were banded (by a 
licensed birdbander) only one bird has ever come to my attention 
again. 
 
The question is also how one measures rehabilitation success or 
survival success? What are the markers for such success? How long 
need an animal have spent in rehabilitation before being considered 
part of a rehabilitation statistic and how long need it have survived 
in the wild post-release to become a success or a failure in the 
statistics? 
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For instance, a sparrow-hawk suffered a concussion by flying into a 
window of a house nestling in Australian bush. The bird spent one 
week in care and was then released in the same spot where it was 
found. From my hand it flew vertically high into the sky and soared 
there for half an hour until it was lost from sight. Is the one week 
care counted as a rehabilitation case? On what grounds would 
anyone want to argue that this release was unsuccessful or its 
survival chances slim as a consequence of rehabilitation or some 
prior disposition? The bird was in splendid health. It would seem 
difficult in those cases to make the point of failure of rehabilitation 
or of waste of time. 
 
Another example: a barn owl (banded) was killed by a car at night 
on a lonely rural road three months after release. The bird was an 
adult when it came into care and remained in care for two weeks. 
Would anyone count the death of this bird three months post-release 
as a failure of rehabilitation or not? I would say that it was not a 
failure. This nocturnal bird might have attended to a roadkill and 
was then in turn surprised and blinded by a car, suffering the same 
fate. The fact that the bird came into care in the first place for an 
injury likely to have been sustained by another car accident is at least 
noteworthy. I would not speak of predisposition but there is a point 
to argue that the bird occupied a poor territory through which a 
gravel road wound in several places. These two examples are not 
exceptional cases. Rather, they may well be typical. 
 
The majority of animals requiring care usually remain in care for a 
period of three days to three weeks. Are these all excluded from 
measures by those willing to seriously propose that only 1-10 per 
cent of wildlife rehabilitation is successful? And even if, for 
argument's sake, my own tally of 65-78 animals successfully released 
per hundred is challenged as being inflated. I might reply: what if 
one were to be ultra pessimistic and ventured to think that in fact 
per annum only 20 of the rehabilitated birds continued to live to old 
age? This may seem a small number. However, there is strength in 
numbers here. If everyone of the 1,500 members of the wildlife 
organisation just saved 20 animals per year (and this is an ultra-
conservative estimate) this would bring the annual net gain to a 
respectable tally of 30,000 saved animals. 
 




This is not to say that other methods, as proposed above (animal 
friendly counter-technology), could not ultimately achieve more. But 
we do not have it at the moment. I am convinced that there would 
not be one person working in rehabilitation or even in captive 
propagation and reintroduction programs who would not welcome 
such technological change. But such tasks have to be left to other 
groups and organisations with other focal points of activity. 
 
Rehabilitation and release of wildborn orphaned 
animals 
 
In another category there are animals coming into care which not 
only require longer care before release but also have to be trained by 
a human foster carer. These are animals that arrive as infants, 
nestlings or juveniles and would die if not cared for. Handraising 
Australian wildlife is now done quite successfully by a large army of 
people from very different walks of life. Here is not the place to cite 
the hundreds of examples of successful reunions with parents or 
flocks or the returns of handraised birds a year after release, or to 
marvel at the observable and repeated return of handraised birds to 
my backyard with new partners in tow. All of these stories, while 
heartwarming, could be dismissed as anecdotal and as statistically 
insignificant successes. 
 
In the case of raising and then releasing animals, there may indeed 
be a host of problems which affect the survival chances of the 
handraised individual. These problems ought not to be down-played 
and it is in this group that some of the negative press may most 
likely arise. Depending on the species, it is mostly not just a matter 
of feeding and caring but often of training the animal into all the 
right behaviours that are essential for that individual’s survival. This 
is often easier said than done. It is relatively easy to teach food 
recognition, provided that the carer has sufficient knowledge of the 
foods that a species eats. Usually, however, foster care offers only a 
limited variety of the foods that are available in the natural 
environment and here lies one substantial problem. The few foods 
that the animal has learnt to identify may not be the foods that are 
available all year round or plentiful all the time and the animal could 
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therefore starve to death. It can also be relatively difficult to teach 
the skills necessary for finding the right food. For instance, I have 
handraised many magpies and I know that they survived for at least 
5 months post-release because they stayed in the area. But how does 
a human teach a magpie that it needs to listen to the sound of a 
scarab larvae underground and then pierce the beak into exactly the 
spot of the sound? We usually find ways around it, such as hiding 
worms under leaf litter, or, if one is lucky enough, find an older 
animal of the same species to act as tutor. It is difficult to teach 
predator recognition and social behaviour towards conspecifics. One 
magpie I had to raise without conspecifics was rather skilled in 
finding food but hopeless in social interaction with other magpies 
and therefore not exactly acceptable in magpie society. Release can 
also pose problems, as to time of year, territory and even time of 
day. 
 
The host of problems associated with handraising wildborn animals 
that are then being released is also strongly associated with our lack 
of knowledge of native species. Here I concur entirely with Glenn 
Albrecht. Knowledge of our wildlife is just in its infancy and patchy 
at best. We need to improve this situation urgently. While this is 
widely recognised, the implementation into education programs has 
been relatively slow and difficult. There are many native species 
about which one cannot find anything written beyond the purely 
descriptive. Behaviour, ecology, diseases are often poorly 
understood. There are still many species of mammals and especially 
of birds on whom we have the most rudimentary knowledge- 
insufficient to deal effectively, i.e. from a knowledge base, with the 
species. To give an example here: on the much adored kookaburra, 
there exists only one book and a hand-full of articles that have ever 
been published and most on ecology, not on behaviour. On the 
magpie, another icon of Australian culture, I have found 35 scientific 
articles written in the last 100 years - and only a handful are on 
behaviour. Our knowledge of behaviour for most other native bird 
species is woefully lacking and in this context, much of the work is 
being carried out in a ‘hit-and miss’ style. We have all learned by 
trial and error—and even if we feel successful cannot say whether 
our preparation was sufficient to carry the individual to adulthood 
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and mating success. Within such context it is not difficult to see how 
rehabilitation, translocation and captive breeding programs may fail. 
 
On the other hand, we have probably the highest incidence of 
grassroots knowledge of local species of any western nation. 
Countless voluntary organisations consisting of individuals who 
have often devoted their lives to the welfare of native species, have 
also amassed vast amounts of experience and knowledge. Sadly, the 
practitioners are often not the writers and valuable knowledge is 
constantly being lost and replenished in endless cycles of 
rehabilitation practice. By contrast, tertiary offers of programs in 
animal behaviour of Australian native species are still in their 
infancy, and this is often so because there is no teaching material 
available. There is thus not just an urgent need for more knowledge 
of native species, especially avian, but it seems well overdue that 
there needs to be a systematic endeavour to break out of the many 
‘catch 22’ situations that surround the gaining and dissemination of 
knowledge concerning Australian wildlife. 
 
Captive breeding programs have some similar issues attached to 
wildborn orphaned rehabilitation programs but unlike the 
rehabilitation programs run by volunteer organisations which accept 
any native animal in need of attention—whether abundant or rare—
captive breedings programs are usually reserved for endangered 
species. These captive breeding programs are indeed largely and 
almost exclusively undertaken by institutions, such as zoos, with 
special breeding licenses. They are cost and labour intensive. 
 
At the same time, all studies have shown that any relocation, 
reintroduction or other schemes are more successful with wildborn 
species than with species born and bred in captivity.24 The questions 
that the failures raise are surely fruitful questions—as long as we 
remain willing to be flexible. 
 
Perhaps they also show us that we need to be vigilant even with our 
abundant species. Wildlife rehabiliation of wildborn species is still 
                                                 
24 Griffith  et al. ‘Translocation as a species conservation tool’, pp. 477-480 and T.J. 
Cade & S. A. Temple, ‘Management of threatened bird species: Evaluation of the 
hands-on approach’, Ibis, 137, (1995), S161-S172. 
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the cheapest and most effective method to date. It would be a 
mistake, in my view, if all efforts went into the end of the decline 
phase of a species. Keep them abundant and many of the 
enormously time and cost consuming efforts of saving species from 
the brink of extinction would not be necessary. For this it is 





The US National Committee for Biology has a program underway 
called ‘DIVERSITAS’. This is an international program and involves 
scholars around the world. It is a program that attempts to integrate 
conceptually (and functionally) all aspects of protecting and 
increasing biological diversity in the world. 
 
They understand that humans play critical roles in this. These roles 
are themselves diverse. What the biologist would like to do is to 
build into the DIVERSITAS program a set of specific roles for 
humans. The questions that they ask are ‘What are the possible 
roles?’, ‘How might these roles be fostered’, ‘By whom?’. And we 
might also ask, ‘For whose benefit?’. There is a need to pull together, 
to form teams of researchers, field practitioners and specialists in 
many diverse areas. P.J.S. Olney and colleagues argued in 1994 that 
we need to show creativity in conservation. Creativity here also 
involves the willing partnership and interface between education, 
public relations, fund raising, behaviour, genetics, captive breeding 
and care, ecology, population dynamics and conservation politics.25 
This is happening now, at least in some corners of Australia and for 
some species. There is little gained in one group ‘knocking’ another, 
or one activity receiving disparaging comments only to defend its 
own. 
 
There are many shortcomings indeed in our present state of 
knowledge and in the overall management of the Australian native 
                                                 
25 P.J.S. Olney, G. M. Mace, et al., eds., Creative Conservation: The Interface between 
captive and wild populations, (Chapman & Hall, London, 1994) and Black, 
‘Threatened Waterfowl’, pp. 125-140. 
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wildlife. My reply would be: there are many steps that need to be 
taken in order to walk a mile. Compassion for animals is surely the 
first step in any endeavour. Another step is rehabilitation, another is 
protecting habitat, yet another is to create laws and policies designed 
to apportion some rights to the natural world and to animals, and 
not just to the human species and yet further important steps 
concern the creation of an educational environment which fosters the 
knowledge and dissemination of knowledge of our wildlife. Why 
condemn anything that is a step in the right direction? We all know 
that it cannot be the only step. 
 
The ultimate aim must surely be that we do not just want animals to 
survive but to have a quality of life commensurate with their 
needs—physical, psychological, social and cultural. The 
rehabilitation programs that have been referred to here are an 
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Whither rights? Animal rights and the rise 
of new welfarism 
Nicola Taylor 
 
he notion of an animal rights movement is one which has the 
potential to mislead since those fighting for animals come 
from a variety of different ideological backgrounds and 
advocate many different ways to achieve many different 
aims. Gary Francione1 argues that animal rights have become 
subsumed in what he terms ‘new welfarism’. New welfarism is a 
hybrid approach which advocates more ‘traditional’ welfarist aims 
in the short term with the ultimate goal being one of animal rights 
and animal liberation in the long term. It is a sort of ‘crisis 
management’ whereby initial welfare problems are dealt with on a 
daily basis but the ultimate goal of liberating animals is never 
forgotten. Francione is critical of this ‘soft option’ and argues that to 
ever achieve anything the animal rights movement needs a return to 
its roots, ie. (direct) action towards the ultimate goal of total animal 
liberation and nothing else. This article takes issue with these 
sentiments and, based on three years of fieldwork within the animal 
rights community, argues that it may be the case that some of the 
larger animal rights charities have adopted this approach, but that 
the movement at the local activist level remains united in believing 
that direct action is the only method desirable or indeed effective in 
achieving its goal, which is one of complete animal liberation. 
 
The generic term ‘animal protectionism’ is perhaps a more apt and a 
more relevant one to explain the vast numbers of people concerned 
with issues of animal abuse, cruelty and rights today since these 
people often come from diverse ideological backgrounds. One way 
to categorize these different backgrounds (should we wish to do so) 
is to argue that there are those involved in animal welfare and that 
                                                 





there are those involved in animal rights and that the two are fairly 
self-contained and are fairly distinct. The only problem with this is 
that there seems to be a third ‘movement’ growing out of a merger 
of these two, hitherto fairly discrete, positions. This hybrid position 
is what Gary Francione terms ‘new welfarism’.2 
 
Animal welfare has always, somewhat mistakenly, been 
characterized as a group of elderly, overly emotional women who 
are eccentrically too concerned with their pet cats. Sexist 
connotations aside, this stereotype is fundamentally misplaced. The 
animal welfare movement came into being on a large and mobilized 
scale for the first time during the nineteenth century in Britain. This 
movement was born out of the wider humanitarian movement 
popular at the time and yet, in many ways, became stronger and 
more enduring than its predecessors. The animal welfare movement 
of the nineteenth century was almost exclusively concerned with the 
issue of vivisection, although there were a small number of 
exceptions to this. Vivisection raised its head as an issue of public 
debate from about the mid-nineteenth century and stemmed from 
the fact that many scientists were only too happy to conduct live 
experiments on animals in public places as a way of displaying their 
newly gained knowledge and techniques. This in turn led to the 
institutionalization of the so-called ‘scientific method,’ ie. the idea 
that the most productive and efficient way to gain biological 
knowledge was from experiments conducted on live animals. It was 
this institutionalization that the nineteenth century anti-
vivisectionists were fighting against. 
 
A number of commentators3 have argued that this anti-vivisection 
campaign was based on a deeper anti-science sentiment, and 
certainly the main players in the anti-vivisection crusade didn’t hide 
the fact that they were highly sceptical of science in general and of 
medicine in particular. Much of this came from the fact that many of 
those prominent in this movement were women who felt that 
                                                 
2 ibid. 
3 R.D. French, Anti-Vivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society, (Princeton 
University Press, 1975); H. Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures 
in the Victorian Age, (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1987) and J. Turner, 
Reckoning With the Beast: Animals, Pain and Humanity in the Victorian Mind, (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1980). 
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medical science (and the growth of gynaecology at this time) was 
taking huge liberties with both women’s and animals’ bodies. 
 
Despite the fact that this anti-vivisection movement was one largely 
comprised of and led by women the sexist stereotype referred to 
above is a poor misconception of a movement and an issue which 
had the strength to ‘divide a nation’.4 The anti-vivisection movement 
of the Victorian era is one which had many public and powerful 
advocates. 
 
I give this brief foray into the history of animal welfare for three 
reasons. The first is to contest a misconceived stereotype; the second 
is because until the 1970s this was the most important, powerful, 
successful and popular movement pertaining to animals and their 
treatment and the third is because many see a logical progression 
from this early humane movement to the animal protection 
movements we have today. 
 
The impetus of the nineteenth century anti-vivisection movement 
largely died with the beginning of the first world war and, although 
there were still a number of animal welfare charities running and a 
few new ones coming into being, none had the powerful hold over 
the public of this early anti-vivisection movement. There was a 
resurgence of interest in animal issues from the late 1960s and early 
1970s but this was a different kind of interest involving a different 
kind of supporter. 
 
The tone of these new animal protection movements was radically 
different to that of the early humane movement. Instead of 
advocating the welfare of animals under our care and for our use, 
this movement argued that it was not morally right for us to 
consider animals our inferiors and therefore it was not morally right 
for us to make use of them. This later movement came to be known 
as the animal rights movement because it was predicated on a belief 
in the natural rights of animals. With this change in ideology came a 
change in tactics. Compared to the animal welfare movement’s 
campaigning methods the methods of this new breed of animal 
                                                 
4 P. Mason, The Brown Dog Affair, (Two Sevens Publishing, London, 1997). 
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rights activist were far more radical. The majority of animal rights 
campaigners believed in the need for direct action. The notion of 
direct action is a tricky one and, due to the inevitable exclusivity of 
media attention on the illegal forms of direct action, is often one 
which conjures up its own stereotype of a masked raider sending 
car-bombs to known vivisectors and spraying paint over fur-coats. 
This is a huge misconception. The majority of direct action 
undertaken by animal rights activists is legal, taking the form of 
protests, marches and leaflet campaigns. 
 
Garner5 argues that the issue of direct action is one which must be 
treated carefully since ‘the association between these extreme 
methods and the radicalism of animal rights and liberation views 
has resulted in a simplistic dichotomy between, on the one hand, 
traditional animal welfare and constitutionalism and, on the other 
hand, the equation of animal rights/liberation with violence and 
illegality’. Not only is this a misconceived notion but most animal 
rights activity is peaceful and law abiding. 
 
When the law is broken in the name of animal rights there are three 
ways in which this is done. Garner typifies these as: ‘the classic form 
of non-violent civil disobedience involving sit-ins and vigils’—also 
included here are break-ins into laboratories which test on animals 
in order to gather information; ‘those actions which set out 
deliberately to cause damage to property’ such as the wrecking of 
laboratory equipment and the shooting of butcher’s windows—to 
this second one I would add theft, ie. the theft involved when animal 
rights activists ‘liberate’ animals from laboratories; and ‘the much 
more serious actions which involve threats to human life and safety’, 
such as the firebombings of department store furriers in the 1980s 
and the letter bombing campaigns of the 1980s. 
 
Although the new animal rights movement from the 1970s onwards 
was one which was radically different in philosophy and action from 
that of the 1870s, its collective belief in the need for direct action and 
direct action alone to secure the liberation of animals is one which 
                                                 
5 R. Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality, (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1993), p. 215. 
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has not been sustained by all involved with the same amount of 
fervour into the 1990s. 
 
The ‘new welfarism’ which Francione6 identifies is not actually that 
new. In 1959 two British scientists, Russell and Burch7, advocated a 
number of changes which could potentially replace the use of 
animals in laboratory experiments. In the meantime, however, they 
called for a number of changes which could either reduce the 
numbers of animals being used or refine their use resulting in less 
pain. Stephens argues that this ‘Replacement, Reduction and 
Refinement constitute the three R’s of the alternative approach to 
laboratory practices’.8 He goes on to point out that ‘the ultimate goal 
of this approach is the complete replacement of laboratory animals 
with non-animal methods that are at least as scientifically sound 
(some would say unsound) as animal based methods’.9  
 
The ‘new welfarism’ which Francione identifies10 is remarkably 
similar to the ‘alternative approach’ identified by Stephens.11 
Francione argues that the rights position is based on the notion that 
some animals at least have rights and ‘that treating them solely as 
means to human ends violates those rights’, whereas the ‘welfare 
position maintains that animal interests may be ignored if the 
consequences for humans justify it’.12 He argues that the two main 
problems which arise out of the welfare approach are firstly that it 
propagates the myth that animal welfarism actually works, which he 
believes to be false. He gives the example of  a reduction in the 
number of animals used in research and argues that the recording of 
these numbers is highly suspect and even if this were not the case 
then it would be difficult to see animal welfare measures as the sole 
causal factor which accounts for the reduction in the number of 
                                                 
6 G. Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Animal Welfare’, 48 Rutgers L. Review, 397 
(1996), http://www.animal-law.org/library/araw/html. 
7 W. Russell, & R. Burch, The Principles Of Humane Experimental Technique, 
(Methuen, London, 1959). 
8 M. Stephens, ‘Replacing Animal Experiments’, in Animal Experimentation. The 
Consensus Changes, ed. G Langley, (Macmillan, London, 1989). 
9 ibid., p. 144. 
10 Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Animal Welfare’. 
11 Stephens, ‘Replacing Animal Experiments’ p. 144. 
12 G. Francione, ‘Animal Rights: An Incremental Approach’ in Animal Rights. The 
Changing Debate, ed. R. Garner, (Macmillan, London, 1996). 
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animals used in research. The second problem he sees with the 
welfare approach is that it implies that animal rights is not a realistic 
alternative to animal welfare which he clearly believes to be false.13 
 
He believes that there is a way to take an incremental approach to 
animal rights without resorting to a warfare position. This 
incremental approach involves ‘the use of deontological norms that 
prohibit rather than regulate certain conduct, that recognise that 
animals have certain interests that are not subject to being 
sacrificed’.14 He further believes that ‘each incremental measure 
erodes the status of animals as property’15 which is necessary if 
animal rights are ever going to be taken seriously and if animals are 
ever going to be afforded some protection by the law.16 
 
Francione sincerely believes that the ‘new welfare’ position is a poor 
alternative to the rights position and, furthermore, he argues that a 
number of animal rights concerns have ‘sold out’ to this position. He 
explains: 
 
It appears as though the new welfarists believe 
that some causal connection exists between 
cleaner cages today and empty cages 
tomorrow…. As a result the animal ‘rights’ 
movement, despite its rhetorical use of rights 
language and its long term goal of abolishing 
institutionalized animal exploitation, continues 
to pursue an ideological and practical agenda 
that is functionally indistinguishable from 
measures endorsed by those who accept the 
legitimacy of at least some forms of 
exploitation.17 
 
                                                 
13 ibid., pp. 55-58. 
14 ibid., p. 53. 
15 ibid. p. 57. 
16 For a further discussion on the status of animals as property see G. Francione, 
‘Animals as Property’, Animal Law, 2 (1996), http://www.animal-
law.org/library/anmlprop.htm and Francione, Animals, Property and the Law. 
17 Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Animal Welfare’, p. 2. 
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It is with these sentiments that I wish to take issue. Francione may be 
correct in arguing that ‘some’ of those involved in the animal rights 
movement have adopted this hybrid approach to animal protection, 
but those involved in the movement at a grass roots level still take 
the view that the only acceptable outcome of the struggle is 
liberation of animals from human oppression which is necessarily 
predicated on a belief in the rights of non-human animals. The two 
are inextricably linked in that action taken to liberate animals is 
based on the ideology of their rights. 
  
As Garner notes: 
 
The growth of mass activism is clearly linked to 
the belief, derived from an animal rights 
perspective, that since so much more is wrong 
with our treatment of animals than was 
previously thought, only permanent and 
sustained activism will help put things right. 
Likewise it is no accident that the use of - 
sometimes violent - direct action has 
corresponded with the development of a rights 
position.18 
 
The field work on which this article is based spans three years and 
involved my regular participation in both animal welfare and animal 
rights networks. The animal welfare data was gained from working 
in two animal shelters over a period of 3 years and then following 
this up with interviews with the staff at the two shelters and with the 
managers of five other animal sanctuaries.  I also regularly attended 
the meetings of one animal shelter which were held with the general 
public every month in order to inform interested parties, and 
financial contributors, about what was currently taking place at the 
sanctuary. The animal rights data comes from my participation in a 
local grass roots animal rights group over a period of three years 
and from a number of interviews conducted with the animal rights 
                                                 
18 R. Garner, ‘The Road to Shoreham: Ideological and Political Aspects in the 
Evolution of the British Animal Rights Movement’, unpublished paper given to 
Alternative Futures and Popular Protest Conference, Manchester Metropolitan 
University, March 1995, p. 12. 
 
 34 
activists belonging to this group. I also subscribed to two larger 
animal rights groups, Animal Aid and British Union for the 
Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV), in order to receive their newsletters 
and information regarding their campaigns. 
 
A small number of those involved in the animal shelters (ie. animal 
welfare) advocated an animal rights position and saw no 
contradiction in the fact that they were working in an environment 
which condoned, if not supported, the use of animals as pets. The 
rationale behind this was that they were working to better the 
welfare of specific animals and whilst, in an ideal world, they may 
not condone animals as pets, the current situation demanded that 
they do something about it. As one interviewee explained: 
 
Its our fault in the first place, I mean we 
domesticated them and now we can’t even take 
care of them. It should be our duty to do that at 
least seeing as though we did this to them in 
the first place. In an ideal world, no, there’d be 
no pets, but right now there are and about 300 
of them are being destroyed on a weekly basis 
because we aren’t dealing with what we’ve 
done so, no, there’s no contradiction between 
what I’m doing now and my animal rights 
beliefs. I’m still fighting for animals’ rights just 
in a different way.  At least here I can be sure 
that this dog or this cat which can’t survive on 
its own gets to live out the rest of its life in 
plush surroundings. It’s the least we can do. 
 
The majority of those involved in animal welfare were not involved 
in animal rights and didn’t particularly feel the need to address these 
issues. For example it has been pointed out that one of the key 
elements in the adoption of an animal rights agenda is in taking a 
vegan/vegetarian diet19 and nearly all of those working in the 
animal shelters were meat-eaters. The only two exceptions to this 
                                                 
19 R. Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality, (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1993) and H. Guither, Animal Rights: History and Scope of a Radical 
Social Movement, (Southern Illinois Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1998). 
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were both moral vegetarians who supported animal rights 
philosophy and were involved in peripheral animal rights 
campaigning such as sponsored dog walks to raise money for 
charities such as NAVS (National Anti-Vivisection Society). 
 
The rest of the workers involved in animal shelters advocated a 
welfare position based on the notion that it is our responsibility to 
care for animals properly, although they tended to be solely 
concerned with pet animals. This usually took the form of  providing 
information about the care of pets and becoming involved in issues 
which directly affected the status of animals as pets such as anti-
quarantine appeals. Most of the staff at the shelters took the line that 
animal rights might in theory be a good thing but for now it was 
fairly unobtainable and at least they were doing something 
worthwhile and productive in the meantime, actions for which they 
could clearly see an end result that improved the status of a number 
of animals, ie. seeing them placed in caring homes. Despite an 
overall agreement that the ideals of animal rights might be 
something worthwhile in the future, the majority of the sanctuary 
workers saw animal rights activists in terms of the media stereotype, 
ie. as violent law breakers single-mindedly intent upon the 
foolhardy liberation of all animals no matter what the effect on the 
environment or the population. 
 
The people involved in the animal rights group however had 
radically different views. The composition of the group was as 
diverse as other studies have led us to believe. There was a small 
number of students which possibly flies in the face of folklore 
concerning animal rights activists. Indeed, one member of the group 
explained that it is difficult to attract younger people to the group 
and if they do come it is difficult to get them to come again. He put 
this down to the fact that the group was often very insular and did 
not particularly welcome newcomers. Being based in a city with a 
number of universities, attracting student interest should have been 
fairly easy and yet there were only one or two current students in 
the group. Most of the group were between 25 and 35 and had been 
students themselves at one time or another.  There was a significant 
number of activists who fell outside this age bracket with the oldest 
being in her fifties. Similarly the activists came from radically 
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different backgrounds. There was a schoolteacher, a university 
lecturer, a number of women who worked at home with children, an 
accountant and a social worker. Those routinely involved in the day-
to-day activities of the group tended to be unemployed which 
allowed them more time to commit to their actions on behalf of 
animals. 
 
All of the group were involved in activism in some way although 
there was a central core of a smaller number (around ten to fifteen) 
who were involved in nearly all the campaigns being run and who 
tended to take responsibility for the organizing of the day-to-day 
activities needed to run a campaign such as allocating the van to 
various areas, ringing round other activists to arrange times and 
venues etc. It has been well documented that the Animal Liberation 
Front (ALF) in particular and the grass roots animal rights 
movement in general is a non-hierarchical ‘organisation.’20 
Although, the term ‘organisation’ itself is misleading, considering 
that each local group sees itself as part of a larger movement but 
there is little formal contact with the rest of the ‘movement’ and 
certainly no centralized command structure. Different local groups 
were in contact with each other as many of the activists attended 
more than one group meeting. Similarly the different campaigns 
were fertile meeting grounds for those in different groups. There 
was also, on occasion, a call for all groups to attend a particular 
campaign when it was felt that more pressure would be productive, 
such as the call for a ‘national hit’ on a particular hunt meeting. 
These would occur for a variety of reasons such as one meeting 
which was infamous for its brutality to the point that the ‘sabbing’ of 
this particular hunt was considered too risky for the activists. In this 
case every year at the beginning of the season this hunt was made 
the target of a ‘national hit’ where all groups would send as many 
bodies as possible to make their presence felt. It was openly 
admitted that not much would be achieved at these hits for the 
animals in question. They were more a way of letting those involved 
in the hunt know that they hadn’t been forgotten and that their 
violence was in vain. 
                                                 
20 D. Henshaw, Animal Warfare: The Story of the Animal Liberation Front, (Fontana, 
London, 1989) and I. Newkirk, 1992, Free the Animals! The Story of the American ALF 




The group meetings I attended certainly adhered to this egalitarian 
de-centralized principle. The chair of the group changed with each 
meeting and within meetings according to who knew the most about 
the topic up for discussion. Thus one person would lead the report 
on the recent hunt sabs that had occurred in the region and this 
would be someone who had been at all, or nearly all of them and 
someone else would lead the discussion about street collections and 
this would be someone who had been involved in the most recent 
street collections and so on. Anyone could contribute to any of the 
discussions and anyone could raise new topics for discussion, even 
newcomers. 
 
Francione, in his argument that the fight for animal rights has 
adopted a ‘new welfarist’ approach, seems to be basing his argument 
on the larger national and international groups involved in animal 
rights campaigns such as the BUAV and People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (PETA). He argues that even the so-called 
more ‘radical’ animal rights groups have recently distanced 
themselves from animal rights and quotes21 Ingrid Newkirk, director 
of PETA, as saying that the ‘all or nothing’ approach of animal rights 
is ‘unrealistic’. 
 
A further example of this line of argument comes from the President 
of the Humane Society of the United States who argued that animal 
rights threatens the ‘kind of respectability that HSUS and a number 
of organizations have worked hard to achieve in order to distinguish 
the legitimate animal protection movement from the more radical 
elements’.22 Francione makes the point that not all advocates 
embrace a welfarist position and that there is a new breed of animal 
advocate who accepts and fights for reform in the short term but still 
sees rights as the ultimate goal: the new welfarist. Although 
Francione’s examples drawn from the larger animal rights charities 
seem to support this argument he does not take into account the 
grass roots activist. 
 
                                                 
21 Francione, quoted in ‘Animal Rights and Welfare’, pp. 4-5. 
22 Quoted in Francione, ‘Animal Rights and Welfare’, p. 6. 
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All of the grass roots activists I met with, interviewed and observed, 
without exception, advocated a ‘rights’ approach based on direct 
action. None of the people involved in grass roots animal rights felt 
the need to belong to any other larger (more mainstream?) animal 
rights charities. As one animal rights activist explained when asked 
if she was a member of any of the larger animal rights groups: 
 
Not cos I’m not interested but I think I’m more 
useful here. The BUAV and the NAVS used to 
be really good, used to do a lot for grass roots 
stuff but when the raids started happening they 
stopped, to the point where they’d make 
damaging statements about grass roots in the 
press. They criticize us and don’t use the 
opportunity to criticize vivisection or whatever 
it is. They don’t have to condone it but they 
don’t have to condemn it either. I think that’s 
really damaging cos it’s not helping animals to 
do that. It gives the press the idea that it is just a 
bunch of extremists rather than talking through 
the issues. That’s why I can’t be bothered with 
it. I think it’s a shame to split it. I wouldn’t 
condemn what they do either cos I don’t think 
we should split it, we all want the same things. 
It’s just a shame that they feel they have to 
condemn us. 
 
Similarly the ALF advocates a strict animal rights approach as 
explained in the animal rights magazine Arkangel: 
 
The Animal Liberation Front carries out direct 
action against animal abuse, rescuing animals 
and causing financial loss to animal abusers, 
usually through the damage and destruction of 
property. Their short term aim is to rescue as 
many animals as possible and directly disrupt 
the practice of animal abuse; their long term 
aim is to end all animal suffering by forcing 
animal abuse companies and individuals out of 
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business. It is a non-violent campaign, activists 
taking precautions not to harm any person or 
animal. Because ALF actions are against the 
law. Activists work anonymously, either in 
groups or individually, and do not have a 
central contact address or any centralized 
organization or co-ordination.23 
 
Although the ALF members, according to the statement above, have 
immediate and long term goals, their immediate goals could never 
be seen to fall into the category of welfarism, and neither could their 
philosophy be summed up by the hybrid approach of ‘new 
welfarism’. 
 
The ALF is not the only direct action animal rights group in Britain 
but it is certainly one of the more infamous if for nothing else than 
its unfavourable media treatment over the last 20 years or so. The 
ALF claim that anyone who carries out actions in line with ALF 
guidelines designed to further animal rights and who is a vegetarian 
or vegan can consider him/herself a member of the ALF. The ALF 
guidelines are: 
 
•  to liberate animals from places of abuse, ie. 
laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc., 
and place them in good homes where they 
may live out their natural lives, free from 
suffering 
• to inflict economic damage on those who 
profit from the misery and exploitation of 
animals 
• to reveal the horror and atrocities committed 
against animals behind locked doors, by 
performing non-violent, direct actions and 
liberations 
                                                 




• to take all necessary precautions against 
harming any animal, human and non-human 
 
This means, technically, that all the people involved in the animal 
rights meetings I attended could consider themselves members of 
the ALF if they so chose. I raise this issue not to cash in on the 
sensationalism surrounding the ALF but to offer an idea of the 
philosophy behind animal protection groups which frequently use 
direct action groups and to make the point that it could not be 
considered ‘new welfarism’. 
 
The activists I met all played a huge part in direct action in one way 
or another, from actively helping on hunt sabs and taking part in 
demonstrations whose sole purpose was to destroy property, to 
helping out at money raising and petition signing stalls. The ethos of 
direct action was so strong within the group that those who attended 
meetings and did not take part in any action were marginalised and 
always maintained the status of ‘outsider.’ One activist who was 
involved in the various campaigns on a daily basis explained that 
she felt guilty about not doing enough even though she was one of 
the most committed members of the group: ‘I don’t feel as though 
I’m doing enough because there’s so much to do I suppose. Ideally 
I’d like to be everywhere and do everything but you can’t.’ 
 
None of the activists I met could be considered ‘new welfarists’ since 
they not only believed in the philosophy of animal rights and 
believed in acting in line with these philosophies but because they 
also openly eschewed the notion of animal welfare: 
 
Welfare stops short of what I want. It’s asking 
for compromise and I don’t like that. I don’t 
want to say can that hen have a bigger cage, or 
can you stop eating meat but keep drinking 
milk. It seems like a betrayal to animals. A lot 
of the welfare stuff is about living a normal life 
as well, campaigning about cruelty but not 
making enough changes in your life to support 
that whereas rights demands a change in your 
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lifestyle. What you eat, drink, wear and even 
think all have to change. 
 
In line with this notion that a commitment to animal rights involves 
a change in lifestyle comes the idea that supporting animal rights, 
unlike supporting animal welfare, is critical of much more than 
cruelty/wrongdoings to animals and that there is a series of 
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omething moved in the grass at the edge of the road. Black 
against bright green. A young crow. It fanned its wings as I 
approached and tried to scurry into the tall weeds. A fledgling 
pushed out of the nest too soon, perhaps? Its tail feathers 
looked rumpled, mangled. My first impulse was rescue: I would 
bring it home, nurse it, maybe keep it as a pet. 
 
It resisted at first, so I spoke to it softly. When I picked it up, it stared 
at me sideways, the way birds do, with a dark, purplish-grey eye. 
Then it curled a foot around my little finger - it felt like the grasp of a 
baby's hand. We were more than a mile from my house, so we began 
walking. The crow made half-hearted struggling movements, but 
after a few moments it settled its throat against my hands, so I could 
feel the warm thud of its pulse. It smelled, oddly, of wet dog. What 
had happened? Most likely it had been struck by a car, misjudging 
the speed of some roaring machine hurtling itself down this busy 
road. I thought of the things a young crow would need to learn to 
survive in this world. Velocity. Who was a friend? Who wasn't? 
 
I tried to imagine how the crow must feel, being carried like this. It 
could hear the usual sounds - the chirping of other birds, the soft 
swishing of the leaves and pine branches, the distant bark of a dog. 
But the feel of my hands around it, the sound of my breathing, were 
alien sensations. I thought of rabbits and rodents being borne away 
by a hawk or an owl. For them such flights always end in death. 
Crows fly, so what could being carried mean to it? It could not 
imagine its own death in the way that humans do, though animals 
and birds clearly sense danger and know fear. This crow, however, 
seemed to be practicing Zen. Resting serenely, breathing low and 
steadily, it seemed ready to accept whatever befell it. Now and then 
it blinked, its veiled eye turning milky blue. 
I thought of many things during the 20 minutes I carried the crow. 




of its warm life. I felt privileged to be on such intimate terms with a 
creature who had never before been touched by a human, who 
experienced the world in a completely different way than I did, and 
who now rested peacefully in my hands. 
 
As we entered my garage, the crow tensed, gripping my finger more 
tightly. I placed it gently in a laundry basket with a pan of water, 
and covered the basket with a screen. Because the crow was agitated 
now, I draped an old table cloth over the basket, the way people 
cover a parrot's cage, to calm it. I thought of bringing it food, but 
what did crows eat? I knew about carrion, but couldn't imagine 
myself scraping the remains of dead things off the road. What else? 
Worms? Corn? 
 
My husband, I was sure, would know. When he came home, an hour 
or so later, we lifted the cloth. The crow partly opened its wings— 
the basket was too narrow for its full wingspread—and stared at us 
warily. The water in the pan had turned bloody, as had a small pool 
on the bottom of the basket. Blood dripped slowly from the crow's 
hindquarters. This startled me, as the crow had not bled earlier. 
Perhaps the way I'd held it had kept the wound closed.  
 
My husband looked at the crow and shook his head. There was 
nothing we could do for it. I picked up the crow and looked into its 
purplish-grey eye, into its tiny black pupil, and told it it was dying. 
It seemed to know. But it didn't thrash or cry out as humans do in 
pain, so it was hard to tell if it was suffering; it simply watched us, 
with that one wary eye. And every three seconds or so a thick drop 
of dark red blood fell from its body. 
 
Would it be more humane to give it a quick death, I wondered. My 
husband, who kills and eats fish and wild ducks and the occasional 
deer, said he couldn't bring himself to kill it. I doubted that I could 
either. But if we left the crow in the basket and let nature take its 
course, the crow would die in a strange human enclosure, confused 





I thought of my own death, what I would want. I would like to feel 
death come and not fear it. I would have death touch me gently, 
surrounded by the things and people I love. So I carried the crow out 
to the field behind our house, down through the tall grasses, to the 
huge blue spruce. Under the low branches where it was shady and 
cool, out of easy view of hawks or cats, I smoothed out an area and 
laid the crow there. It blinked at me and kept very still. 
 
All afternoon I pictured the crow in its sheltered nook under the 
fragrant branches, among the grasses and wildflowers. From its cool, 
shady bed it could watch the drifting sunlight, hear the humming of 
insects, the conversations of birds overhead. And softly, softly, death 
would come, like a shifting shadow, like dappled light, like wind 
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In what respects, if any, should the 




uman beings are undoubtedly blessed with the most 
extraordinary gift of nature—the most sophisticated 
consciousness. However, it is also this superb awareness 
which shackles some Homo sapiens with an abject 
humiliation - an irrational horror of their animality. The human 
animals’ realisation of their biological, hence finite, condition can 
impel them to fearfully disclaim their ancestry and strive to 
'transcend' their natural condition. The human species' claim to 
superior physical and moral status in the natural world on the basis 
of either their 'unique' rationality, dignity or worth, is specious. 
Traditional western philosophical, religious, scientific and literary 
ideologies have initiated and sustained a myth that the other 
animals, including the Great Apes other than Homo sapiens, are 
inferior members of the natural world. These ideologies have 
contributed to our primate cousins’ exclusion from the opportunity 
to relish a life suffused with physical, intellectual and emotional 
dignity. 
 
In this article I intend to briefly appraise some of the areas within 
western traditional ideologies which have perpetuated the attitude 
that all animals, other than human, are not entitled to be treated with 
even the minimal degree of respect accorded to some human beings. 
I also intend to evaluate contemporary sources which indicate that in 
view of recent field studies and scientific research on the non-human 
primates, existing objections to the extension of equality (implying 
moral obligations) to the other primates1 can no longer be sustained. 
Recorded attempts of the search by western scholars for an 
explanation of the origins of the species, particularly the existence 
                                                 
1 References in this article to 'the other primates', 'non-human primates', 'other 
Great Apes' refer to those primates other than human presently taxonomically 





and nature of the human species, reveal that theories have been 
swayed either by disarming ignorance or misplaced conceit.  From 
audacious beginnings as humble ‘prickly barks’2 (c.500BC), the 
human animal has become elevated in status to the extent that 
humans generally consider themselves to be the sublime result of the 
biological evolutionary process. The notion of the human animal's 
supremacy over inanimate and all other animate living forms gained 
credence, in part, because of the acceptance of the influential works 
of the Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384-322BC).3 
 
Following his categorisations differentiating plants, animals and 
humans, Aristotle concluded that what clearly differentiates humans 
from the other animals is that the human alone, of all animate things, 
has the capacity to reason. Whilst other animal beings and plants 
have the ability to perceive or respond to environmental factors, 
they do not have consciousness, that is, they lack self-awareness and 
the ability to reason abstractly. Rather than use reason, plants 
respond to stimuli, and animals 'obey their instincts'.4 
 
Furthermore, Aristotle's claim of the existence of a 'principle of rule 
and subordination in nature at large' also contributed to sanctioning 
the idea that animals exist without any intrinsic worth.5 
 
Plants exist to give subsistence to animals, and 
animals to give it to (men). Animals...serve to 
furnish man not only with food, but also with 
other comforts...Accordingly, as nature makes 
nothing purposeless or in vain, all animals must 
have been made by nature for the sake of men.6 
 
                                                 
2 Anaximander, quoted by Plutarch, in Early Greek Philosophy, J. Barnes, (Penguin, 
London, 1987), p. 73. 
3 Aristotle, 'Parts of Animals' in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, Book 
1, Chapter 1, 645b, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991), p. 998. 
4 Aristotle, Politics, trans E. Barber, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977), I.V., 9, 
p. 6. 
5 ibid., V, 1, p. 91. 
6 In this article, the generic 'men' or 'man' is retained solely for the purpose of 
quoting ad verbatim. See Aristotle, Politics, V111, p. 95. 
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As animals exist within nature without the capacity to reason (being 
guided instead by instincts) they are, therefore, provided by nature 
for the use of the human being. 
 
Apart from the influence of ancient Greek writers such as Aristotle, 
the writings of the ancient Hebrews and later of Christian 
theologians were also instrumental in the formation of a demeaning 
attitude towards the other animals within western culture. In the 
ancient Hebrew text The First Book of Moses, called Genesis7, two 
aspects in particular warrant attention. The account of the origin of 
the human within the world: 'So God created man in his own  image, 
in the image of God created he him; male and female created he 
them.'8 reflects an existing cultural belief in the pre-eminence of the 
human species, especially the male of the species. Furthermore, 
instructions to humans to 'have dominion over the fish of the sea, 
and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth 
upon the earth'9 authorises humans to adopt authority over all the 
animals. 
 
Later Christian doctrines also reflect the disparate relationship 
between humans and the animals. In his work Summa Theologica, St. 
Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274) advises 'There is no sin in using a 
thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such 
that the imperfect are for the perfect...things, like plants which 
merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for 
man.'10 In addition, Aquinas' ruling 'it matters not how man behaves 
to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power'11 
would have undoubtedly contributed to reinforcing cultural beliefs 
of the mental and moral supremacy of the human and exacerbated 
existing exploitative practices against the animals. As a result of 
these doctrines, the other Great Apes, in particular, have been 
especially maligned within western cultural discourse and 
symbolism. 
 
                                                 
7 Genesis, The Holy Bible, (King James version, 1611), pp. 5-64. 
8 ibid., 1:27, p. 6. 
9 ibid., 1:28, p. 6. 
10 Aquinas, from ‘Summa Theologica’, quoted in Animal Liberation, P. Singer, 
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1976), p. 211. 
11 ibid., p. 213. 
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Of all the animals, the non-human primate has been most 'deeply 
involved in western ideas on human nature, morals and origins'12 
and consequently occupies a prominent, yet paradoxical, position 
within western cultural symbolism. In traditional eastern cultures 
monkeys and apes were accorded respect as they were considered to 
be mediators between the human and a deity, or alternatively were 
personified and revered as a deity.13 In comparison, apart from a 
period in the eighteenth century when apes were pictured as gentle, 
'human-like creatures', western culture has tended to stereotype the 
primates as savage, brutal beings; beings personifying licentious or 
evil behaviours—behaviours deemed as uncivilised or immoral 
within human societies. Furthermore, the primates were generally 
the objects of derision, being perceived as either intriguing 
zoological exhibits or as creatures deserving extermination.14 
 
The non-human primates have long endured being the 'object' of 
human fascination. Fascination itself, if applied with consideration 
and courtesy towards the being who is viewed, is not necessarily a 
problem.  However, the present ambiguous biological15 and moral 
standing of the other primates within western communities is not a 
reflection of our society's 'fascination with the primates', but rather 
an attitude which reflects the fact that our fascination has mostly 
been perverse. Unlike the other animals, however, the non-human 
primates do occupy a unique position in the psyche of humans and 
in the natural world. To the consternation of some humans, the non-
human primates alone of all  animals other than human, most 
resemble in form and behaviour the human animal. 'They are neither 
completely human, nor completely animal, but both at once'. None 
but the other primates 'inhabit the margins of humanity'16, a 
                                                 
12 R. Corbey, ‘Ambiguous Apes’, in The Great Ape Project, eds., P. Cavalieri & P. 
Singer, (Fourth Estate, London, 1993), p. 129. 
13 ibid., pp. 129-130. 
14 ibid., p. 131. 
15 I am of the opinion that the present taxonomical categorisation of the 
chimpanzee primate and the human primate does not honestly reflect the human's 
kin relationship to them. In evolutionary terms, the chimpanzee and the human 
share a 'recent' common ancestor, are genetically dissimilar by less than 1% and yet 
are classified within separate families, namely Pongidae and Hominidae 
respectively. 
16 Corbey, ‘Ambiguous Apes’, p. 130. 
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collective of privileged primates reluctant to accept, let alone 
approve, a change in status for our cousins from 'object' to subject. 
 
The realisation within recent times of the Great Ape's capacity to be 
self-aware, to reason and to feel has gradually altered, to a degree, 
cultural perception of them and given rise to the dilemma regarding 
their disenfranchisement from the moral domain. The rigid 
distinction traditionally assumed to exist between the human and 
other animals has proved difficult to maintain, especially in light of 
indisputable evidence of the primate origins of humankind.17 In 
addition, a more sophisticated understanding gained through the 
scientific disciplines including genetics and molecular biology has 
led to a reappraisal of the existing taxonomic systems, particularly 
with regard to the human/animal distinction. Furthermore, recent 
field studies and scientific research have contributed to scientific and 
ethical challenges to existing theories and beliefs in relation to our 
kinship with, and our unethical treatment of, the other Great Apes.  
 
Results from studies conducted to assess the cognitive abilities of the 
primates have issued a challenge to the most cherished 'hallmark' of 
the human—the ability to reason. The ability to reason arises from 
the faculty of consciousness, the origin of the experiences referred to 
as thought, self-awareness, emotions, intentionality etc. The human's 
claim to be entitled to occupy a privileged and dominant position 
within the natural world, including the animal kingdom, is based 
upon the belief that the human animal alone has the 'unique' ability 
to reason. This claim, however, is contested by researchers Roger 
Fouts and Deborah Fouts18 following their studies with chimpanzee 
primates. The researchers claim that demonstrations of an array of a 
complex set of abilities, and spontaneous communication amongst 
themselves and with human researchers, verifies the undeniable 
existence, within the chimpanzee primates, of non-human thought. 
 
                                                 
17 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, (Faber & Faber, London, (1889), 1979). 
Whilst Darwin did not emphatically state that the human being was indeed an ape 
(p. 217) his explication of the origins of vegetative and animal species (being both a 
biological and an evolutionary process) resulted in altered cultural perceptions 
and eventual scientific acceptance of the primate origins of humankind. 
18 R.S. Fouts and D.H. Fouts, 'Chimpanzees' Use of Sign Language', in Cavalieri & 
Singer, The Great Ape Project, pp. 28-41. 
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In one particular investigation19 of the cognitive abilities of 
chimpanzees, Fouts and Fouts conducted a remote videotaped study 
of chimpanzees using American sign language in over five thousand 
instances. According to Fouts and Fouts, demonstrations of certain 
behaviours previously considered unique to the human and 
associated with the human's reasoning process were demonstrated 
to be present within the chimpanzees.  For example, like humans, 
chimpanzees are able to use what is referred to as 'referential 
communication', that is, the chimpanzees have the ability to think 
about, and comment on things and events in their environment. In 
addition, the employment of 'informative signing' indicates that the 
chimpanzees are able to ask for things not in their immediate 
environment.20 The ability to refer to things and events not in an 
immediate environment was previously thought to be an ability that 
only humans are capable of possessing. Also, the use by the 
chimpanzee subjects of 'expressive signing' to spontaneously express 
an emotion when upset or excited by something21 is an indication 
that chimpanzees, as well as humans, subjectively experience 
emotions. Furthermore, according to Fouts and Fouts, chimpanzees 
not only displayed evidence of imagination and memory but are 
able, following the acquisition of human sign language, to pass the 
language on to following generations.22 
 
It is apparent from results of this particular study by Fouts and Fouts 
that chimpanzee beings are able not only to communicate within 
their own kind, but possess the capacity to reason to the extent that 
they have the ability to 'adopt' a human language to reciprocate the 
human's attempt to communicate with them. The study further 
indicates that chimpanzee beings are capable of acting with a sense 
of purpose, that is, intentionally, and that they too experience 
emotions. The study therefore negates the human being's claim to 
what was previously considered an ability unique to the human—
reason. It also provides an opportunity to challenge another human 
presumption: on the basis that humans are biologically unique 
because of their capacity to reason and are therefore intrinsically 
                                                 
19 ibid., pp. 33-39. 
20 Fouts and Fouts, ‘Chimpanzees’ Use of Sign Language’, p. 35. 
21 ibid., pp. 35-36. 
22 ibid., pp. 36-39. 
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valuable, the human alone of all creatures is the sole creature eligible 
and entitled to claim the right to a life infused with physical, 
intellectual and emotional dignity. 
 
If acceptance into the community of equals is on the proviso that one 
be a conscious being, that is a being able to reason, having the 
capacity to feel emotions, feel pain and suffering, and be self-aware, 
then the evidence from the above study alone indicates that calls to 
include the other Great Apes within the human moral domain are 
not based upon theoretical delusion or misplaced sentimentality, but 
upon empirically verifiable facts. 
 
According to the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights’23 the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world depends upon 
recognition of not only the inherent dignity of the human being but 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family.24 The fundamental rights accorded to humans: 'Everyone has 
the right to life, liberty and security of person. No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' 
(Articles 3 and 5)25, were intended as a common standard by which 
nations could promote respect for the intrinsic value of all members 
of their communities and the human species universally. These 
particular rights are vital to human beings, particularly if they are 
living within societies reluctant to recognise the intrinsic worth of an 
individual. Without them their hopes of living a life with some sense 
of security and general well-being are diminished. 
 
Needless to say, if the human scientific establishment eventually 
managed to recognise the human being’s kinship with the other 
Great Apes, the human moral community also needs to do some 
research. The universal human moral community is in a position to 
use its moral agency to recognise that a number of 'our family' are 
being denied the opportunity to exercise their  inalienable rights to 
life, liberty and freedom from torture. 
 
                                                 
23 The General Assembly, United Nations, 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights' 
(1948), in Human Rights, C. Freeman, (B.T. Batsford Ltd., London, 1990), pp. 66-68. 
24 ibid., p. 66. 
25 ibid., p. 11. 
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In 'A Declaration on the Great Apes'26, a group of persons concerned 
with the current status and plight of the other Great Apes is 
lobbying for the  'extension of the community of equals to include all 
great apes: human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans'.27 
The 'community of equals' is defined as the moral community within 
which its members accept certain basic moral principles or rights as 
governing their relations with each other and which are enforceable 
at law.28 Amongst these principles or rights are included: 
 
• The Right to Life  
 The lives of members of the community of 
equals are to be protected. Members of the 
community of equals may not be killed 
except in very strictly defined circumstances, 
for example, self-defence. 
  
• The Protection of Individual Liberty 
 Members of the community of equals are not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. 
  
• The Prohibition of Torture 
 The deliberate infliction of severe pain on a 
member of the community of equals, either 
 wantonly or for an alleged benefit to others, 
is  regarded as torture, and is wrong.29 
 
As mentioned previously, of all the Great Apes, only the human ape 
is protected by legislation against denial of the above three basic 
rights. The human ape also has recourse to anti-discrimination laws, 
unlike our cousins, who are dependent upon others to combat the 
crime of 'speciesism'. 
 
                                                 
26 ibid., p. 11. 
27 ibid., p. 4. 




Speciesism, as defined by Singer, is 'a prejudice or attitude of bias in 
favour of the interests of members of one's own species and against 
those of members of other species'.30 Given that there are differences 
between humans and non-human primates, and that the capacity to 
reason within the other primates is not as 'sophisticated' as the 
humans' ability to reason, it needs to be recognised that there are 
also members of the human community with varying degrees of 
mental capacity.31 
 
Human individuals such as infants, comatose and brain-damaged 
persons and those afflicted with mental illness are protected by 
statutory rights from being excluded from the human moral 
community regardless of their mental capacities and/or ability to 
exercise their autonomy. 'If possessing a higher degree of 
intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his(sic) 
own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the 
same purpose?'.32 It stands to reason that on the basis that the other 
Great Apes possess consciousness, self-awareness, and have the 
capacity to reason and experience emotions, they are just as entitled 
to be included within the community of equals as are the able and 
less abled members of our species. 
 
It is beyond dispute that the primates, including the human, share a 
specific morphological feature - the central nervous system - a 
product of which is the physical experience of pain. Considering that 
it has been scientifically proven that the other primates also have 
self-awareness, one could safely infer that they, along with the 
human primate, share not only the feeling of pain but also the 
experience of misery arising as a result of it. Apart from 
physiological evidence, common sense should enable the human 
species to acknowledge that suffering as a result of experiencing 
pain is an experience common to both us and the other primates. 
This knowledge does not generally appear, however, to impel 
                                                 
30 P. Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals, (Jonathan 
Cape, London, 1976), p. 7. 
31 Heta Hayry and Matti Hayry, 'Who's Like Us?', in Cavalieri & Singer, The Great 
Ape Project, p. 176. 
32 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 7. 
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human beings to exercise their moral agency in a manner humane to 
our kin. 
 
A human being in possession of his/her faculty of consciousness is 
aware that there is a limit to the endurance of pain. Upon reaching a 
point at which endurance is insufferable, at least the human can 
physically and verbally articulate his/her anguish. Recognition of the 
commonality of the experience of misery resulting from suffering 
pain does not appear to be a primary concern in the attitude of some 
humans conducting experiments upon other sentient animals, 
including the other primates. As Singer has succinctly noted ‘[w]hile 
we overlook our savagery, we exaggerate that of other animals’.33 
 
The human species, let alone a human community of equals, is 
somewhat of a misnomer. In spite of nations uniting and declaring a 
charter of universal human rights, historically, some western 
individuals and their societies have not always managed to behave 
in an egalitarian manner. The subjugation of women and 
enslavement or genocide of indigenous peoples, for instance, are 
prime examples of some peoples' attitudes to certain members of the 
species. Human resistance to change is understandable to the degree 
that those occupying positions of power and dominance are 
reluctant to alter the 'status quo' and forgo their privileges. Some 
humans’ propensity to assume a recalcitrant attitude is, I believe, 
rather accurately reflected in the following quote: 
 
Man usually either considers himself a self-
made animal and consequently adores his 
maker, or assumes himself to be the creation of 
a supreme intelligence, for which the latter is 
alternately congratulated and blamed. An 
attitude of humility, abasement, contrition, and 
apology for its shortcomings is thoroughly 
uncharacteristic of the species Homo sapiens, 
except as a manifestation of religion. I am 
convinced that this most salutary of religious 
attitudes should be carried over into science. 
                                                 
33 Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 248. 
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Man should confess his evolutionary 
deficiencies, and resolve that, in future, he will 
try to be a better animal.34 
 
Given that our understanding of biological beings has advanced, 
especially since the advent of molecular biology, and given the 
scientific evidence of the existence of reason and self-awareness in 
the non-human primates, contemporary society is now in a position 
to seriously consider evidence repudiating former views which were 
detrimental to the well being of the primates. As Hooton states, the 
human animal could indeed be a better animal. Rather than 
presuming that Homo sapiens is positioned at the pinnacle of the 
evolutionary process, the human species could extend consideration 
to all the other animals. The other animals could be viewed as 
successful adaptors of their specific species, animals who too can 
reason and feel. At the very least, the other Great Apes could be 
extended the courtesy of being treated as the subjects they are and 
receive their due entitlements of 'the right to life, the protection of 
individual liberty and freedom from torture'.35 
 
As the present situation stands, intervention in the non-human 
primates' lives in human controlled situations is not without 
attendant complications. It is obvious upon reading the concerned, 
even passionate, accounts36 of their encounters with the other Great 
Apes, that some researchers, observers and carers hold these special 
Beings in the highest esteem. However, by imparting specifically 
human cultural behaviours and concepts to the other primates there 
is, I believe, the possibility of some members of the human species 
attempting to impose our culture upon them. 
  
Our level of awareness, apart from bringing us our most exquisite 
joys, also brings us our greatest angst and, at times, awesome 
sorrow. 
 
                                                 
34 E.A. Hooton, from ‘Apes, Men and Morons’ (1937), quoted in The Evolution of 
Evil, T. Anders, (Open Court, Illinois, 1994),p. 73. 
35 The Editors and Contributors, ‘A Declaration on Great Apes’, Cavalieri & Singer, 
The Great Ape Project, p.4. 
36 ibid., pp. 1-312. 
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What does it mean to be a self-conscious animal? 
The idea is ludicrous, if it is not  monstrous. It 
means to know that one is food for worms. This 
is the terror: to have emerged from nothing, to 
have a name, consciousness of self, deep inner 
feelings, an excruciating inner yearning for life 
and self-expression—and with all this yet to 
die.37 
 
Imposition of the 'condition' known as human upon the other Great 
Apes would be highly questionable, if not inhumane. Far better they, 
our cousins - 
   
  relish their freedom under their canopies and skies 
                                    we be relieved of reading their suffering with 
                                                        mad, bleeding eyes.             E.M. 
 
Bernard Rollin's inspirational appeal for the extension of the right to 
life, liberty and freedom from torture to the non-human primates:  
  
We should let them be...(with) their 
inexhaustible wonders and grandeur, And let 
the dictum be proclaimed—know without 
hunting, see without manipulating, cherish in 
itself, not for myself38 
 
captures a notion of equality already implicit in feminist ethics.  It is 
one, I believe, which could foster not only acceptance of, but a 
universal respect for, all living beings regardless of sex, gender, race 
or species. 
 
One would hope with the approaching millennium and the 
corresponding two thousandth anniversary of the western ethical 
system - which claims mercy to be one of its principal tenets - the 
human species would unfetter, from the criminal arena of 
speciesism, our primate cousins. 
                                                 
37 E. Becker, quoted in T. Anders, The Evolution of Evil, p. 179. 
38 B.E. Rollin, 'The  Ascent of Apes - Broadening the Moral Community', in 




For my cousins - 
      (especially 'the Girls') 
    My cousins are wailing,  waiting 
              The earth is listening,  weeping 
    I am hearing,  hurting 
    Learning,  believing 
    Planning. 
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Ethical approaches to animal-based science: Proceedings of the Joint 
ANZCCART/NAEAC Conference held in Auckland, New Zealand, 19-20 
September, 1977, v + 159pp, ANZCCART, New Zealand, 1998.  
 
The Australian and New Zealand Council for the Care of Animals in 
Research and Teaching (ANZCCART) is a body active in the 
promotion of ethical positions in relation to animal experimentation 
while continuing to espouse the benefits of such experimentation. In 
1997 with the (New Zealand) National Animal Ethics Advisory 
Committee, ANZCCART convened a Conference on this area and 
Ethical approaches of animal-based science contains the Conference 
papers.  
 
There are six key themes in these papers. In the first contributors 
explore the value systems which might operate in ‘animal-based 
science’. The expression has a rather ominous ring as it suggests that 
the use of animals is necessary to the science to such an extent that 
the science could not exist without them. Indeed the papers in this 
section do seem to take it as given that animals will always be used 
in experimentation in science but in a gentle way they do succeed in 
at least showing how ethics has a place in science, a position which 
still does not have complete acceptance in the scientific community.  
 
Two papers take up the topic of societal consensus, public policy and 
animal welfare awareness looking at public opposition to 
experimentation and how this has promoted ‘respect for individual 
animals, adherence to the Three Rs, and competent analgesia, 
anaesthesia, and after-care.’ (p. 49) It probably would be true to say 
there there is no societal consensus on this issue. However the 
opposition discussed is portrayed as rather simple minded. For 
instance Royce Elliott states that ‘It is still contended that animal 
experimentation has been of no benefit to humans’. (p. 50) One does 
not have to accept this belief, in order to consistently oppose such 
experimentation. It is possible to agree that there have been 
enormous benefits but argue for instance that humans have now 
reached a state of understanding and sensitivity towards other 
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beings such that experimenting on them appears a very undesirable 
option. 
 
The third theme deals with the recognition of animal pain and 
suffering and refinements of techniques to minimize both of these. 
This is well done. A short paper looks at how the Three Rs are 
promoted. This is mainly on the functioning of ethics committees. 
Some criticisms are mentioned and some interesting legal reforms 
suggested. The following grouping of papers explores the operation 
of animal ethics committees further. While some pertinent points are 
made the question about whether alternatives to animal research are 
sufficiently well promoted is not adequately addressed, yet 
replacement is one of the Three Rs which many writers say they 
support. 
 
The fifth theme is on vertebrate pests (eg possums, goats, pigs and 
deer) and their control. These are important concerns in Australia 
and New Zealand, with no easy answers. The final section contains 
an interesting collection of papers on animal welfare, putting animal 





Groves, Julian McAllister, Hearts and Minds, 230pp. Temple University 
Press, Philadelphia, 1997. 
 
In Hearts and Minds Julian McAllister Groves examines the dynamics 
of a localised political debate centred around the use of animals in 
medical experiments at an unnamed US university. The book focuses 
on two active groups in the debate, an anti-animal experimentation 
group called Animals Anon and a group of researchers who use 
animals in their studies and who began responding to the protests 
staged by Animals Anon. Not aiming to persuade the reader to one 
side of the debate or the other, Groves is interested rather in how the 
participants in the debate feel about animals in research, ‘why they 
feel the way they do, and how they feel about their feelings’ (p. vii) 
and to this end offers a vivid and interesting account of a range of 




He begins by outlining the main theoretical tool of the book; the 
notion of shame, which he sees as central to both ‘sides’ of the 
debate. The work of Thomas Scheff is used to identify the presence 
of shame in the motives and responses of both animal experimenters 
and protesters alike, this being the first of several similarities Groves 
constructs between the two groups. He locates himself at length 
within the debate by expressing sympathy toward Animals Anon 
and towards ‘animal rights’ in general though he does not make 
clear precisely what his views on animal experimentation are. 
 
In chapter two Groves identifies what becomes for him a major 
dilemma in human/animal interaction, that is the simultaneous use 
of animals for human purposes and the keeping of pets (where 
strong affective ties to the pets are experienced). How is it that 
humans can both love and consume animals? To some, of course, the 
keeping of pets and the consumption of animals as food and as 
scientific and technological aids is in no way a contradiction, rather, 
both may be seen as aspects of an instrumentalist view of animals as 
available to meet the needs and desires of humans; for food, freedom 
from disease or companionship. This account of animal use is not 
investigated however, and the perceived dilemma persists as a 
theme throughout the book, supporting the primary notion of 
shame.  
 
The ‘dilemma’ is particularly evident in Groves’ account of the 
members of Animals Anon, many of whom seem equally concerned 
with the simultaneous use of animals as commodities and as pets. 
Members are portrayed as primarily, though not exclusively, middle 
class women, pet lovers whose initial motivation as a group began 
over the routine sale of impounded pets to animal experimenters at 
the university. In relation to this focus on pets, Groves notes 
amongst these members a wariness toward expressions of sentiment 
about animals in debating the rights and wrongs of vivisection, and 
an awareness that rational argument may be a more effective means 
of securing public support. In contrast, Groves suggests, animal 
experimenters tend to shy away from scientific or overly rational 
argument, emphasising their connectedness with animals and their 




Both ‘sides’ are acutely aware of the strategic nature of their debate 
and the need to present themselves in ways that may prove 
influential to the public. Groves acknowledges this, though more 
consideration of the implications of the debate as a strategic exercise 
would have been most welcome. What does it mean that scientists 
feel the need to appear more compassionate and emotional while 
animal activists want to appear more logical and dispassionate? 
Some brief discussion of gender issues is included here, but a deeper 
look at the dichotomising of ‘hearts and minds’ both within the 
debate and in western culture generally might have yielded valuable 
insights. While Groves claims to investigate how people feel about 
animals and how they feel about how they feel, by his own account 
he is more likely to uncover how they talk  about animals and how 
they talk about how they feel. The relations between feeling and 
talking in this strategic context needs to be carefully examined. 
 
The book argues for a kind of continuity between the animal 
experimenters and Animals  Anon, suggesting that both groups feel 
compassion for animals and do not wish to see them suffer. Groves 
recognises that for scientists, this concern is primarily paternalistic, 
with scientists viewing themselves as ‘stewards’ of nature while 
many members of Animals Anon reject such a relationship. In spite 
of this he argues that ‘animal rights activists and animal research 
supporters are not as different as they have been made out to be 
with regard to their feelings about animals’. (p. 28) As feminists 
amongst others know, the difference between paternalistic concern 
for the welfare of a dependent and recognition of the inherent 
integrity of a being is fundamental. Groves’ failure to adequately 
understand the nature and significance of paternalism here relates to 
his earlier ‘dilemma’ about consuming animals and keeping them as 
pets. Where both consuming and keeping are understood to be 
aspects of a paternalistic or ‘stewardly’ approach, there is no 
dilemma. 
 
Groves uses his research into Animals Anon (twenty activists) to 
generalise about animal activism and to offer insight into ways of 
solving conflict between experimenters and protesters. 
Unfortunately his extrapolation from such a small sample is 
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methodologically unjustified and certainly, his descriptions of the 
preoccupations and views of some of the activists interviewed 
present them as relatively conservative within the ‘animal rights’ 
political arena. The group is by no means abolitionist in its shared 
outlook and as such, requires very different analysis and 
intervention than might groups with an abolitionist agenda. Equally, 
the theme of shame bears quite differently upon those who eat 
animals and keep pets yet oppose animal experimentation, 
compared with those equally opposed who do not keep or eat 
animals. While Groves creates quite a complex account of the 
differences amongst the activists, he notes that the only African 
American activist he saw was excluded from his study as ‘atypical’. 
(p. 151) His own varied descriptions would suggest that a ‘typical’ 
activist might be difficult to identify, though as I have noted, 
generalisations on his part are by no means eschewed. 
 
Broadly, the book performs an interesting shift away from the issue 
of animal experimentation onto the actors involved in the debate, a 
shift that is always a risk for those also concerned with the debate 
itself, as Groves claims to be. Focusing on the protagonists in a 
struggle over issues of suffering, justice or integrity is valuable 
where light is shed on the social context around that debate, or on 
strategies, their meaning for the culture in which the debate is 
played out and thus the potential for just resolution. Groves 
concludes by offering advice as to how the conflict between animal 
experimenters and protesters could have been resolved, suggesting 
that ‘for the grassroots organisations like Animals Anon, it is clear 
that small, symbolic concessions to the activists can diffuse the 
controversy’. (p. 192) Here, concern for the just resolution of the 
issue of experimentation on animals is superceded by the desire to 
end conflict per se, without concern for changes to laboratory 
practice or improvement in quality of life for the animals. This may 
be an effect of the shift away from the issue toward the protagonists, 
where the issue is discarded, in favour of a different ‘problem’; the 
resolution of conflict between protagonists themselves.  
 
The book ends by focusing on the insights that conflict resolution to 
be found in the animal experimentaion debate through accounts of 
specific confrontations that might have proved more fruitful if 
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handled differently. Clearly, both ‘sides’ are guilty of inconsistencies 
both in their material practices and the opinions they profess and 
perhaps what is most unsettling about Hearts and Minds is that while 
Groves offers suggestions for better ways to respond or 
communicate in specific situations, he rarely adequately draws out 
the significance of these inconsistencies to the failure of the 
situations or makes the inconsistencies central to the problem and its 
resolution. I have already noted that the book is not about the issue 
of animal experimentation, but about the protagonists in the debate, 
so that prolonged analysis of the subjects’ views may not seem to be 
appropriate. However, the value of his insights to other contexts is 
uncertain. The extent to which the issue of animal exploitation in 
medical research can be satisfactorily resolved through diplomacy 
more than through material change remains open, particularly in 
relation to abolotionist agendas. Certainly, it is not a tactic that 
remains untried outside Groves’ research context. 
 
Suzanne Frazer  
 
 
Lesley J. Rogers and Gisela Kaplan. Not Only Roars and Rituals: 
Communication in Animals,  x + 230pp 
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998. 
 
The question of enshrining animal rights in law is currently being 
debated in the New Zealand parliament. A bill has been proposed 
which will recognise primates' fundamental rights not to suffer cruel 
and degrading treatment. In an article in the Sydney Morning Herald 
reporting this debate, the World Society for the Protection of 
Animals is cited as supporting the recognition of apes' rights for the 
reason that humans and apes are 97% genetically identical. New 
Scientist, however, is quoted as critical of this idea, stating that this 
fact of genetic similarity does not justify the recognition of rights. 
Interestingly, New Scientist argues that the test of similarity to 
humans should instead be based upon language use: ‘Language that 
allows thinking about thinking should be the test of similarity to 
humans’.1 
                                                 




Even overlooking the question of the privileging of thinking in this 
view (why should thinking about thinking be more important than, 
for instance, thinking about feeling, or even feeling about feeling?), 
the question of language use in animals is one which has vast 
significance for animal rights. A book which deals in detail with 
animal communication, then, could have direct political 
consequences for the treatment of animals by humans. 
 
The opening statement, ‘Researching animal behaviour is a 
humbling experience’, gives the reader a good guide to the approach 
of Lesley Rogers and Gisela Kaplan in Not Only Roars and Rituals. 
This is a special book because of its rare combination of scientific 
learning and detailed up-to-date information with the authors' own 
experiences in communicating with animals (from scientific field 
trips and from their domestic environment), and their obvious love 
and respect for animals. This combination of the personal and the 
scientific blends in a highly readable and clear account of issues 
around communication across many animal species (from primates 
to birds and dolphins, amongst others), and articulates a clear ethical 
and scientific position on humans' relation to, and understanding of, 
animals. 
 
Rogers' and Kaplan's credentials in the field of animal 
communication are impressive. Rogers holds a Personal Chair in 
Neuroscience and Animal Behaviour at the University of New 
England, Australia, and is the author of over 200 scientific papers 
and a number of books (including Minds of Their Own: Thinking and 
Awareness in Animals).2 She is well known for her work in the area of 
brain development and function. In 1994 she and Kaplan also co-
authored a book on their field study of orang-utans, entitled Orang-
utans in Borneo. Kaplan is a social scientist and ethologist who has a 
special interest in communication in primates and vocalisation in 
birds. As becomes clear in the book, she is also very involved in 
wildlife rehabilitation, specialising in native bird rehabilitation. 
Rogers' and Kaplan's combined experience and knowledge then is 
scientific, personal, and practical. 
                                                 




Not Only Roars and Rituals functions as a clear and detailed 
introduction to the field of animal communication. Many of its 
chapters are issue-based, and cover the questions ‘What is 
communication?’, ‘Is animal signalling intentional or unintentional?’ 
and ‘Do animals learn to communicate, or is communication 
genetically based?’. These significant and fundamental questions are 
explored with numerous examples both from the scientific literature 
and from evidence from the authors' experience in living and 
working with animals. Two other chapters focus on communication 
in birds and mammals respectively, and there is also a final more 
discursive chapter on human-animal relationships. Issues of 
scientific methodology and research ethics are addressed in relation 
to the research reported in each chapter. Rogers and Kaplan give 
concise explanations of how such research is undertaken, note any 
problematic ethical considerations, and outline the logic of the 
research methodologies. They also suggest further areas of research 
in many instances. For the reader without a background in this field, 
then, the book's approach is very valuable. 
 
Perhaps the most fundamental question addressed by Rogers and 
Kaplan is that concerning differences between humans and animals. 
In their analysis of animal communication they are interested not 
only in the hundreds of interesting facts cited, but also in providing 
a point of view on the philosophical and ethical question of the 
human/animal distinction. In relation to this, Rogers and Kaplan are 
concerned to point out the error of assuming that just because it does 
not look as though animals are communicating we can know that 
they are not. As they argue, animals can be shown to communicate 
in ways which are neither audible nor visible to humans (these 
include the use of ultraviolet signals, ultrasonic emissions, odour 
emissions and seismic signals). The development of innovative 
research techniques (such as the use of sound spectograms, which 
can graph the frequencies of animal sounds which are inaudible to 
human ears) is necessary here, and Rogers and Kaplan give many 
examples. 
 
Even more basic is the issue of whether animals can be said to 
communicate in a way that bears any resemblance to human 
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communication. Using numerous examples, Rogers and Kaplan 
argue that animals do indeed communicate with intention and do 
learn to communicate (rather than such communication being simply 
a product of genetic programming). Citing the well-known examples 
of Alex the parrot (trained by Irene Pepperberg at the University of 
Arizona), Washoe the chimpanzee (trained by Allen and Beatrix 
Gardner of the University of Nevada) and Kanzi the bonobo (trained 
by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh), and others, Rogers and Kaplan 
demonstrate that animals can be shown to understand and even to 
use human language. This destroys one of the most central 
arguments made for the human/animal distinction, namely that 
humans use language in a unique way.   
 
Studies of animal-animal communication (as opposed to animal-
human communication) also indicate that the complex use of 
language is not a unique human quality. Rogers and Kaplan cite 
studies of dolphin and whale communications which show that 
these animals not only use unique identifying codes for particular 
animals (which are used like names), but that particular groups 
share communication elements which are understood only within 
their groups and by other members of the same species (thus 
forming animal communication cultures). These findings show that 
animal communications are not simply genetic but, like human 
languages, are learned, individually meaningful, and even cultural. 
Roars and Rituals leaves the reader with a clear sense both of the 
complexity of scientific research into animal communication and of 
the fascinating diversity of communication systems and abilities. My 
one criticism of this book is that the stories told in relation to these 
are often overly short and leave the reader wanting more details. 
The wealth of different tales is great, but it can be a little 
monotonous if none of these are developed to any great extent. For 
example, we are given tantalising glimpses into Kaplan's work 
rehabilitating birds and her resulting knowledge of their 
communication systems, but these are glimpses only. On occasion I 
would have liked to read fewer examples, but to gain a more 
indepth insight into one of the examples cited. The characters of this 




In general though, the book makes a powerful and important 
argument about the complexity of animal interactions and the 
problematic nature of any clear animal/human distinction based on 





Clark, Stephen R. L., Animals and their Moral Standing, viii + 194pp., 
Routledge, London and New York, 1997. 
 
In the introduction to this collection of papers, written over a period 
of some twenty years, Stephen Clark draws attention to two aspects 
of his work which may be of concern to some readers. First, he 
points out that those who seek them may well find inconsistencies in 
the papers, and will certainly find some repetition. While this might 
be seen as meriting criticism in a continuous work, it would be more 
worrying, in this context, if the papers showed no sign of change and 
development over time. Such change is quite compatible with an 
overall consistency which rests on Clark’s unvarying respect for 
animals and concern for their defence. 
 
A single example will serve to illustrate the point above. Four of the 
essays deal with the question of rights for animals. All four also 
include a discussion of utilitarian theory, and of the significance of 
the inclusion of non-human animals in the utilitarian calculation of 
the greater good. Although Clark acknowledges that the ‘good 
utilitarian’ does not believe in rights, he nevertheless explores ways 
in which some utilitarians have been prepared to allow rights to 
both humans and other animals, and he explores other theoretical 
routes to the same end. At the same time, it becomes quite evident 
that Clark, himself, is strongly opposed to utilitarianism which, in 
the final essay, ‘Modern Errors, Ancient Virtues’, he identifies as a 
principle ‘bereft of rational support’, and he shows little more regard 
for rights-based theories. He is not, of course, opposed to rights for 
animals, but sees them as being of little significance in practice. One 
must therefore ask why Clark has spent so much care in the 
examination of views with which he finds himself increasingly at 
odds. At one point, Clark seems to suggest that this is simply what 
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philosophers do, but there is, of course, a purpose underlying the 
activity. It is often productive to engage with those who seek the 
same end through different means. It may be even more useful to see 
that the same theory can be used to serve quite different ends. 
 
The second matter which Clark brings to our attention in the 
introduction is the fact that he writes as a Christian philosopher. 
There is little in the following essays which is likely to prove 
unpalatable to even the most convinced atheist, but this profession 
of faith is still of some interest. For most of its history, Christian 
teaching has expressed little concern for the non-human, and Clark 
specifically rejects what he speaks of as humanist Christianity. When 
he wishes to give examples of ‘ancient virtues’, of a time when there 
was more familiarity between human and non-human, it is to the 
pre-Christian Scriptures that he turns. These scriptural allusions are, 
in any case, rare, and Clark is quite ready for them to be treated as 
metaphor, but there is little doubt that his religious faith gives 
support to some of his philosophical attitudes, to his confident 
realism and to his holistic approach to the care for the biosphere. 
What interests me most in this book, however, is not that Clark is a 
professed Christian, but that he is a professed zoophile with an 
interest in both biology and ethology. 
 
Although I do not wish to underestimate the contribution made by 
Peter Singer to the debate on the treatment of animals, I have always 
been somewhat disconcerted by his simultaneous dismissal of 
‘animal-lovers’ and his insistence that the moral principle of equal 
consideration of interests should not be arbitrarily restricted to 
members of our own species. It is difficult to see how we can give 
any rational consideration of interests to members of a species about 
which we know little and care nothing. Like Singer, Clark is fully 
aware of the dangers of sentimentalism, but he argues that 
sentiment, that is, personal and unreflective attachment or attraction, 
may be the prelude to rational discovery. In ‘The Consciousness of 
Animals’, he suggests that knowledge arises from a loving attention 
to what is knowable, a view that he fully recognises as a rejection of 
the postulates of the Enlightenment. It is just such attention to a 
creature’s particularity that gives us the hope of discovering what it 
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perceives and how it does so, knowledge which would make us the 
better able to consider its interests. 
 
Clark does not only link sentiment and knowledge, but argues 
strongly that natural sentiments are the necessary roots of morality. 
Morality does not develop through the exercise of reason, but 
through local and familial concerns for children and friends. As 
Clark says, aphoristically, we are moral because we are mammalian, 
and there is much evidence to support his view. Behaviour that we 
regard as good, care for those in need of care, is to be found in 
mammals other than humans, and this care is not always confined to 
conspecifics. Certainly, as Clark points out, the human family, from 
its beginnings, has included members of other species. Clark is not 
suggesting that reason has no part in morality, or that moral 
obligation ends with the family, or even at the threshold of the cities 
that he sees as the set of households, but, however far our 
responsibility extends, even if it is over the whole earth and into 
space, our moral sensibility develops in our immediate family and is 
extended from there. 
 
There will no doubt be some who find Clark’s views objectionable. 
As he, himself, admits, if he is right, it is not possible to quite 
eliminate subjective discrimination without destroying the natural 
roots of our morality. One might argue that this is accurate 
observation rather than theory, but there will be those who seek 
greater objectivity and prefer to see morality as the province of 
rational adults, presumably human, even if their duty of care 
extends to members of other species. 
 
Tom Regan, whose work is discussed in several essays, shares with 
Clark the view that there is no discoverable difference between all 
humans and all non-humans that would license different moral 
treatment, but he attempts to justify this view in a very different 
way. Regan makes use of the Kantian notion of the human subject as 
end-in-itself and therefore worthy of respect. He notes that for Kant 
the subject is a rational subject and that this excludes some human 
beings, infants and the senile, for example, and he suggests a 
different category, subject-of-a-life, which would include the 
previously excluded, both human and other animals. Clark treats 
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Regan’s arguments sympathetically, but he points out that the only 
rights that all subjects-of-a-life could have seem to be the very 
minimal ones of extreme right-wing liberalism. As he says, what 
concerns him is not abstract political rights but concrete historical 
ones, and he admits, quite frankly, that he is more concerned about 
the rights of ‘British beasts’ than about the natural rights of all other 
animals. This is wholly in accord with his perception of morality as 
having its origins in nature, in the family, and I venture to suggest 
that, in the same way, Australian readers of this review are likely to 
be concerned about Australian animals. They are the ones closest to 
us, the ones with which we are familiar, and the ones with which we, 
sometimes reluctantly, share our territory, and these animals may be 
the natives who live in our gardens or nearby national parks, the 
dogs who sleep at our feet, or the farm animals on display at the 
agricultural show. 
 
Although I have attempted to give some indication of the topics 
addressed by Clark in this book, I have not been very successful in 
conveying the flavour of the work as a whole. Clark has indicated 
that he writes as a Christian, but I would suggest that he also writes 
as an Aristotelian. The two are, of course, not incompatible, but, in 
my view, it is the influence of Aristotle that dominates in this 
context. It can be seen in the frequent quotations, in the belief in the 
natural origin of the moral law, in the effort to perceive the quiddity 
of other animals, which is surely nothing other than Aristotelian 
form by another name. Above all, it can be seen in Clark’s constant 
effort to engage in constructive dialogue, to find a middle way in the 
many disputes which bedevil those who try to think about animals 











Orlans, Barbara R., Beauchamp, Tom L., Dresser, Rebecca, Morton, 
David B. and Gluck, John, P., The Human Use of Animals: Case Studies 
in Ethical Choice, xi + 330 pp., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. 
 
The Human Use of animals is mainly a collection of case studies which 
raise ethical issues concerning the use of animals in biomedical 
research, cosmetic safety testing, behavioural research, wildlife 
research, education, food and farming. It also covers the use of 
animals as companions and for religious rites. Biomedical and 
behavioural research receive the fullest coverage. The authors try to 
expose the strength of argument on both sides. Sometimes this is a 
little strained as in the discussion of head trauma studies using 
baboons. Also most of these issues deserve to be treated in a broader 
framework where the possibility of using alternatives to animals (or 
not pursuing the research or life style at all) is treated more 
seriously. Nevertheless the authors do succeed in admirably laying 
out some of the complexities of the debates over the use of animals. 
 
Skutch, Alexander F., The Minds of Birds, xvi + 183pp., Texas A & M 
University Press, College Station, Texas, 1996. 
 
In reports of his detailed observations of birds over many years, 
Skutch argues that their mental capacities have been grossly 
underestimated. In particular Skutch emphasises the capacity of 
birds to recognize other birds and humans. They have good 
memories and anticipate the future. They cooperate well, especially 
when breeding. They are affectionate and playful. They can be 
taught to count, and have a good sense of time. Some use tools. They 
appear to have an aesthetic sense, can dissimulate (for instance to 
protect their young). Skutch claims that this demands ‘cool 
calculation and quick wits’. Pepperberg’s remarkable findings with 
the African Grey Parrot are outlined. This is a beautifully written 
book, full of fascinating detail with a comprehensive bibliography on 




Russon, Anne, Bard, Kim A., Parker, Sue Taylor, eds., Reaching into 
thought : The minds of the great apes, xii + 464pp., Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1996. 
 
Reaching into Thought contains 19 articles from psychologists and 
anthropologists on the mental abilities of the great apes and 
monkeys. Some classic studies are here, for instance Tetsuro 
Matsuzawa and Gen Yamakoshi’s comparison of chimpanzee 
material culture between Bossou and Nimba, West Africa and 
Christophe Boesch’s summation of the evidence gathered from the 
wild supporting the notion of a culture in chimpanzees. The 
collection also contains one of the best philosophical articles on what 
self-awareness or self-knowledge might consist in when considering 
humans, apes and monkeys. Other articles take up issues such as 
tool use, imitation, pretence and  chimpanzees use of rules. This 
book is a serious challenge to anyone denying the capacity of great 
apes to think. 
 
Mech, L. David, Adams, Layne G., Meier, Thomas J., Burch, John 
W. and Dale, Bruce W., The  Wolves of Denali, x + 238pp., University 
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998.  
 
Denali is a National Park in Alaska and the wolves there form one of 
the largest protected populations in the world. Mech and his team 
have been studying these wolves for nine years and The Wolves of 
Denali presents the results from research in 1986 to 1994 in a detailed 
yet accessible manner. The findings give an excellent basis for 
thinking about issues such as the reintroduction of wolves into 
national parks in the United States, the effect of wolves on prey 
populations such as caribou in Alaska, the value of national parks to 
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